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1. Introduction 
1.1 Choice of Theme  
Islamism1 is a concept that is increasingly heard everywhere. Scholars on the Muslim 
religion or the Arab societies have used the concept for some time. The worldwide 
press and the common man and woman have more recently taken this concept in use, 
especially after September 11th .  
My interest in this phenomenon can be traced back some years. I have learned that 
Islamism is a complex label that should be used with caution. Accordingly, I find it 
odd that more and more people arbitrarily refer to the concept, either when talking 
about demonstrations in the Middle East, Muslim priests (Imams) or terrorists. Most 
of all, Islamists are looked upon as something very different, odd, violent etc. To sum 
it up: Islamism produces fear. This follows the argumentation of Edward Said in 
Orientalism (1978). He accuses the Western world in particular of looking upon the 
Middle East as something different, exotic and at the same time barbaric. It can be 
argued that this view has bloomed with the increased attention on Islamists 
worldwide. Hence, I find it important to increase the focus on this subject. Without 
knowledge it is impossible to understand people’s behaviour, and the risk of drawing 
incomplete conclusions of prejudice are present. 
In many Middle Eastern and North African countries the Islamists represent the 
largest opposition to the regimes in power. To explore and explain this growth of 
Islamist movements will not be the main task of this thesis. Instead, I have chosen to 
look at the Islamist connection to democracy. Interestingly, the Islamists often 
demand democratisation of the political system in their countries. They accuse the 
regimes in power of being autocratic and undemocratic. The leading regimes on the 
other hand often claim their devotion to democracy, but reject the Islamists as 
                                              
1 The definition of Islamism will be accounted for in chapter 2 
 8
terrorists or simply as people who do not possess certain qualities that need to be 
fulfilled if taking part in democratic elections. Usually Islamists are rejected to 
participate in the political contest because of their religious connection or suspicions 
of involvement in violence. Many governments articulate their dissatisfaction with a 
party that is trying to monopolise Islam. Religion is for everyone and is not going to 
be used by any particular party or movement, they argue. The Islamists on their side 
deny that they are trying to monopolise religion. They hold that they are only 
speaking on behalf of one way of interpreting the Muslim religion.  
I have chosen to concentrate on the Tunisian Islamist movement, En-Nahda2. My 
main reason for focusing on En-Nahda is the extensive work that Mr. Rachid 
Ghannouchi, the movement’s leader, has put down on defending an Islamic 
democracy. 
Democracy is not a term widely discussed in Islamist doctrine even though many 
demand democratisation of the current political situation in their countries. 
Ghannouchi and En-Nahda have, however, made broad efforts in constructing their 
own democratic system. One has to assume that En-Nahda’s stand on democracy is 
far more radical than most Islamist groups in this matter.  
When analysing Islamist views on democracy, I found it best focusing on one 
movement. For the sake of conducting an extensive analysis, I had to choose a 
movement with an articulated and deeply founded view supportive of democracy. I 
will, however, stress that the group’s articulated support for democracy does not 
mean that it automatically will be defined as democratic. But if choosing a group with 
negative views on democracy my analysis would be limited down to a rather short 
curiosity.          
1.2 Research Objective 
It has been argued that democracy is a Western concept and might therefore only 
work fully in Western contexts (Huntington 1993). Nevertheless, many scholars 
                                              
2 The Arabic term is Hizb al-Nahda. Tamimi has argued that the English name is Ennahda. However, just like Tjomsland I 
have chosen to use En-Nahda, thus respecting the English spelling at the same time as it is similar to the original name.  
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disagree on this interpretation of the concept or choose to ignore this notion (Hefner 
1998, Krämer 1993, Sisk 1992). To conclude and accept that democracy will not 
work in non-Western countries seems simple. Though I see that different cultures and 
religions may conflict with the way Westerners are used to see democracy, it would 
be wrong not to try and see this from other perspectives. 
I will in this dissertation avoid seeing democracy as a strictly Western concept.  
 
According to Islamism in general3 God is the ‘original governor’, and to fully 
separate religion and state is impossible on the basis of Shari’a (the Islamic law). An 
Islamic state will have to implement and protect the Shari’a as the source of laws. 
Accordingly, an interesting question is whether the Islamic law, Shari’a, is absolute 
or adaptable to people. Most Muslims agree that the part of Shari’a that contains 
people’s relation to religion (Ibadat) is final and not to interfere with. An interesting 
issue in this regard is how Muslims look upon the religion-society relation 
(Mu’amalat) that contains for instance economic, political and family life. Is 
Mu’amalat adaptable and possible to interpret for the people?  
This is widely discussed among Muslims in general and Islamists in particular.  
As a result of Shia conviction, that the Quran is made of God in time, they are 
positive to human-made laws. Sunni-Muslims, on the other hand, believe that the 
Quran is eternal and this makes them more reluctant to human-made laws. Many 
Islamists, however, tend to see the possibilities of human lawmaking as a natural 
consequence of God’s wisdom. God left the details of political organisation open to 
the Muslim community so that they could decide upon this according to their needs 
and aspirations (Krämer 1993:5).    
The question that derives from this is the following: 
 
If humankind is free to some degree to decide on issues regarding state and society, 
will this mixing of religious laws with politics allow for a democratic system?     
                                              
3 I will not discuss Islamism in general throughout this dissertation since I find it impossible to look upon this as one 
coherent phenomenon. Nevertheless, from my basic definition of Islamism, made in chapter 2, it can be derived that all 
groups calling themselves Islamists have a goal to implement the Shari’a as the state’s main source of jurisprudence.    
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Since my dissertation is narrowed down to the Tunisian Islamic movement En-
Nahda, my problem to discuss will more accurate be: 
 
To what extent is the Islamic democracy of the Tunisian En-Nahda democratic?  
 
A common criticism towards Islamists, mainly articulated by the sitting regimes, is 
that the Islamists use democracy only of pragmatic reasons to get to power. Their 
critics fear that once the Islamists are in position there will be no more talk about 
democratic values or principles.    
My intention is not to speculate on whether the movement will actually do as they 
say, if ever given the chance to rule. That would be an impossible task. I will rather 
analyse whether what they are actually saying in some way represents a sort of 
democratic system. 
More precisely, I will have to investigate the ideology mostly elaborated by Rachid 
Ghannouchi, the leader of En-Nahda. Though there have been other people at the top 
of the organisation, Ghannouchi seems to be the main contributor to the En-Nahda 
ideology.     
 
1.3 Analytical approach   
In this dissertation I will examine En-Nahda’s concept of Islamic democracy. 
Consequently, I will analyse whether this Islamic organisation can be defined as 
democratic. In deciding upon this I will apply theories on democracy. Evidently 
theories on democracy differ, and do not constitute a unified concept. Accordingly, I 
will try to simplify the picture by categorise into distinct alternatives. I will analyse 
En-Nahda’s model by comparing and categorise its views on democracy with these 
theories. I see no point in operating with a model of variables that establishes the 
causes of the En-Nahda ideology.  
Due to the focus on Islamists, the mixing of religion and politics will be discussed. 
Hence, the question of religion may have an impact on the results. I need to explore 
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whether the mixing of religion and politics excludes the possibility of a functioning 
democracy. This debate will first be treated in general terms, before exploring the 
consequences in the specific case of En-Nahda.  
 
1.4 Methodological considerations   
1.4.1 Qualitative case study 
When answering a thesis one has to be conscious of how to approach the field of 
study. The approach chosen is both decisive for how the work is being conducted, 
and the results received. I have chosen the qualitative method for my thesis. An 
important principle within the qualitative method is to achieve a deeper 
understanding of the research units (Holme & Solvang 1996:87). To understand the 
research units’ situation is significant. Accordingly, the more knowledge the 
researcher possess the better. The results will be received by the interaction of 
theoretical and empirical understanding (Holme & Solvang: 1996:93).  
Ib Andersen states that a case study is an empirical analysis (Andersen 1990:122). 
The analysis aims at investigate a contemporary phenomenon where the boundaries 
between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident (Yin 1994:13). 
Additionally multiple sources of information are used in the investigation of the 
phenomenon (Andersen 1990:122). 
Svein S. Andersen (1997) divides case studies into three different categories 
depending on how they relate to theory in their design. In A-theoretical case studies 
the aim is not to use concepts or theories, or to understand some abstract construct or 
a general problem. The case under study is descriptive and tries to reveal the social 
reality and the uniqueness of the case (Svein S. Andersen 1997:62). The second 
category comprise interpretive case studies. Interpretive studies applies concepts and 
theoretical approaches to explore how conditions influence a certain event or 
phenomenon. The aim is not to generalise one’s findings in order to develop a theory, 
but rather to employ theoretical perspectives as conceptual structures or as advanced 
organisers (Svein S. Andersen 1997:69). The third and last category of case studies is 
concerned with generating theory, where the aim is to provide insight into an issue 
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through refinement of theory. The case itself is of secondary interest, but it plays a 
supportive role in facilitating the theoretical understanding of a phenomenon through 
the testing of hypotheses (Svein S. Andersen 1997:73). 
My analysis could have been of the A-theoretical category in that the case in study is 
rather unique. Nevertheless, I have chosen to use theoretical concepts to organise the 
analysis, accordingly my case sorts under the second category, interpretive case 
study.      
Case study is also the most used strategy when analysing organisations. Few 
observation-units but several variables are considered typical for a case study 
(Andersen 1990:121). In my thesis there is only one organisation, En-Nahda. 
Consequently, this makes my study a single case study (Andersen 1990:123). 
The focus on one organisation is made out of practical considerations and limited 
resources. I could have picked out another or more Islamist organisations, and made a 
comparative analysis. Such an approach could provide valuable information about 
differences or similarities between Islamist organisations. On the other hand, I would 
probably not have been able to analyse En-Nahda thoroughly. My choice is therefore 
not oriented towards generalisations. I am not trying to establish that Islamists in 
general are either democratic or not. My case in this regard is unique. I have chosen 
Tunisian En-Nahda for a reason: their special approach to democracy. One could say 
that En-Nahda, with Mr. Rachid Ghannouchi in front, is among the most moderate 
Islamists you can find. I am aware of the critique I could receive due to selecting such 
an moderate Islamist group for my thesis. Still, the point I am trying to make is that 
Islamists differ in opinion and approach, and that some Islamists could be democratic 
or semi-democratic.   
1.4.2 Sources and collection of data 
To get reliable information and a comprising understanding of the situation, it is 
necessary to use a variety of sources. I have mostly used secondary sources such as 
books and articles. The information received have been checked and supplemented 
with some primary sources such as the political manifest of En-Nahda and a personal 
interview with Mr. Rachid Ghannouchi.  
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In that data’s validity is dependent upon high reliability, this is crucial for any data 
collection. If the collection and the treatment of data are done with a high level of 
accuracy, the reliability is high as well (Hellevik 1994:43). Opposite, a low level of 
accuracy will give a low level of reliability. However, high reliability does not 
necessarily mean high validity (Hellevik 1994:43). High validity means that the data 
collected is adequately reliable and relevant to answer the thesis. You may have 
collected accurate data, but if you use these data to say something about a slightly 
different subject it results in a low level of validity (Dahl 1973:67, Hellevik 1994:43).        
Primary sources are often considered as reliable data. In this thesis I have used the 
En-Nahda manifest of 1988. A primary source, such as a manifest or political 
program, is supposedly reliable, but there might be difficulties when analysing such 
materials. My interpretations are partly based on primary sources; still the results of 
the interpretations are mine alone.  
I got the chance to interview Mr. Rachid Ghannouchi in Oslo June 9th, 2003. In a 
personal interview there is no problem concerning the reliability of the source. 
Ghannouchi must be considered a reliable source being the leader of En-Nahda. As to 
what Dahl describes as semantic problems, how to interpret the content of the source, 
this is explained as a successive process (Dahl 1973:64). First there is a problem 
concerning language. My interview was conducted in English. This is the second 
language of both the interviewer and the respondent. I have to take this into account 
when analysing the results. As to what Dahl refers to as reale interpreting terms (Dahl 
1973:64-65), I need to trust my general knowledge concerning the issues in question.  
Other interviews used are conducted by others, and are to be considered as secondary 
sources. I can not be certain of how the questions and answers were influenced and 
interpreted, since I was not present. Consequently, I will only use this information as 
a supplement to other data. Additionally, I have used a couple of articles written by 
Ghannouchi.   
Secondary sources are widely used in this thesis. In a tense situation like this where 
an organisation is banned in the home-country, it would be an impossible task to 
collect all the information by myself. Accordingly, I have good use of books and 
articles written by scholars. However, it is important to have in mind the tense 
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situation between the Tunisian government and En-Nahda. To achieve an overview of 
the different stands, who’s taking sides in the conflict etc, is of great relevance. Some 
scholars that I refer to are coloured in their presentation. To exemplify, Hamdi is a 
former member of En-Nahda as well as a scholar. In contrast, Hermassi is both 
professor in Sociology and currently Minister of Culture in the Ben Ali government. 
Likewise, Islamist expert Burgat is seen as quite positive in approaching Islamists 
and their impact on Islamic societies, while scholars such as Roy and Kepel articulate 
a decline and lack of faith in Islamists’ impact.       
In my interview with Rachid Ghannouchi he stressed his support to the presentation 
of En-Nahda, made by Assam Tamimi. Accordingly, I have laid emphasis on 
Tamimi’s book in this thesis.  
In using Tunisian newspapers I will to take into account the widely repressed 
situation of the journalists in the country. They are not entirely free to express every 
side of a story.  
Tunisia is a country with an Arabic speaking population. However, French is widely 
used and most Tunisians speak both languages. I don’t speak or understand Arabic 
which constitutes a problem. I do on the other hand read and speak some French. 
Still, I am often put in an impossible situation when Islamists make a point out of 
publishing their writings exclusively in Arabic. Luckily some of this literature is 
translated into English or commented in English. 
1.5 Further Outline 
The overall goal in this thesis is to evaluate the Tunisian Islamist organisation En-
Nahda, and their claim of being a democratic organisation. Most people would 
intuitively conclude that Islamists and democracy are two very different things and 
therefore incompatible. I intend to analyse this connection more closely before 
making any conclusions.  
Chapter 2 is descriptive in that I am trying to give an overview of Islamists in 
general. I will describe the re-emergence of Islamism, central goals, and different 
classifications of the organisations. I will also try to portray some of the movements 
and their followers. In chapter 3 I will investigate the theoretical fundament. 
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Democracy is not a simple term that forms one single theory. Accordingly, I will 
explore different perspectives and approaches.  
Religion’s part in politics is vital to this thesis. Accordingly, I will include a broad 
discussion on the question of religion and politics. A presentation of the general 
discussion on Islamism and democracy is made in 3.3. 
Chapter 4 is an empirical description of the rise and evolvement of the Tunisian En-
Nahda. I feel the need to give a short description of the organisation before analysing 
its stands in chapter 5.  
This chapter is divided into 3 parts. In part one I will analyse En-Nahda’s stand in 
relation to 3.1. Part 2 of chapter 5 is about Ghannouchi and En-Nahda’s relation to 
secularism and religion in politics. Finally, in 5.3, I will sum up the results found in 
the previous discussions, categorising the movement according to my democratic 
alternatives.  
In chapter 6 I will summarise my findings, and draw a conclusion to the questions 
proposed in chapter one.  
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2. Islamism 
Different names have been used on these groups with approximately the same ideas 
both in scholarly work and the mass media. This can be both confusing and 
inaccurate.  
In the early phase of these studies Islamic Fundamentalism was the name most 
frequently used. Unfortunately, it is not very precise. “All those who call to a return 
to foundational beliefs or the fundamentals of a religion may be called 
fundamentalists” (Esposito 1999:5). This could include all practising Muslims, who 
accept the Quran as the literal word of God and the Sunna (example of the Prophet 
Muhammad) as a normative model of living (Esposito 1999:5). Fundamentalism 
originated in the context of American Protestantism covering those who advocated a 
literalist interpretation of the Bible. These were regarded as static, retrogressive and 
extremist, wishing to return to and replicate the past. Few organisations in the Middle 
East fit such a description. These groups often use the latest technology in their work 
and their interpretation of Islam is often inventive and new (Haugom 1995:9-10). The 
phenomenon also has a negative sound, and Western observers in an early stage saw 
these movements as reactionary, extremist religious groups acting on the basis of a 
literal understanding of Islam (Tjomsland 2000:27). Scholars were investigating the 
cause of the problem, not accepting the phenomenon as something that existed in its 
own right (Tjomsland 2000:28-29).  
Political Islam is a concept that implies the interpretation of Islam as a political 
ideology. Still, many politicians in the Middle East have been using Islam as a tool to 
legitimise their politics without any further connections with this ideology. The 
Tunisian President, Ben Ali, promised a stronger emphasis on Islam and Arabic 
identity when he seized power in 1987. He both restricted groups like En-Nahda and 
at the same time strengthened Islam in public by implementing more religious TV-
programs, announcing a Minister of religion and by reopening the Islamic university 
in Zeitouna (Roy 1994:127). 
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Islamism has been increasingly used in resent years. The concept implies an 
ideological connection as well as a differentiation from Islam. Most important is the 
use of Islamism by the groups themselves, Islamic or Islamist movement (al-haraka 
al-islâmiyya) (Utvik 1993:200). I will in the following use the name Islamism when 
referring to these groups in general.     
2.1 Resurgence of Islam 
The significance of the Islamic movements became evident in the end of the 1970s 
and during the 1980s. The Islamic revolution in Iran and the assassination of Egypt’s 
President, Sadat, forced Muslim governments and the world to pay attention to this 
phenomenon. The different governments in the Muslim world had for years ignored 
these forces or believed they could be used to destabilize the radical leftist opposition 
(Kepel 1994:25). Instead the Islamists suddenly appeared as a major oppositional 
force and a threat to ruling regimes. Governments in the Muslim world had not 
predicted this politicisation of the religious revival. Following this development many 
scholars have put down a lot of effort to explain the rise of Islamist forces in the 
Muslim societies. Laura Guazzone argues that the rise and spread of Islamism is the 
consequence of several social, cultural, political and economic causes. She believes 
that these problems can be traced back to two major interacting factors:  
 
1) “the cultural contradiction produced by the kind of access to modernity in the 
Arab world; and 
2) the crisis of efficiency and legitimacy of the political ideologies and systems 
established after independence” (Guazzone 1995:4).   
In addition, from the mid-1970s there has been an increasing urbanization in many 
Muslim societies without an adequate economic growth (Guazzone 1995:4). This 
development has intensified the combined effects of the two root causes identified 
above.      
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2.1.1 Religion in response to modernity 
By the end of the nineteenth century and throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century, European expansion was seen in the Middle East and North Africa through 
imperialism and colonisation (Esposito 1999:48-49). Many Muslims felt their 
societies were in danger because of a perceived Western superiority.  
The Muslim society was challenged politically, economically, morally and culturally 
(Esposito 1999:49). Recognition of internal weakness of their own communities, the 
external threat of Western imperialism and the acknowledgement of the value of 
modern science and technology made people frustrated (Esposito 1988:153). Ayubi 
defines development as “a process through which an entity can reach its maximum 
potential, both quantitatively and qualitatively” (Ayubi 1991:48). Effectiveness is 
vital to any development process, but should, according to Ayubi, be defined within 
one’s own cultural reference. What happened in the Muslim world, according to 
Esposito, was that development was based upon “a theory of modernization that 
equated development with the progressive Westernization and secularization of 
society” (Esposito 1999:7). This process of Westernization and secularization was not 
easily translated into Muslim minds and culture. Small elites of the society took part 
in this process, while the rest of the population did not (Esposito 1999:7). Although 
most people wanted a process of development within their societies, they were not 
ready to copy the West. Muslim morals, culture and history were not seen as 
something to sacrifice on the way to a more modern society. As a result, an Islamic 
revival was seen in intellectual circles. Islamic reformers responded to the impact of 
the West by substantive attempts to reinterpret Islam to meet the new challenges in 
Muslim societies (Esposito 1988:127). These reformers, led by Jamal al-Din al-
Afghani (1838-1897) and his disciples Muhammad Abdu (1849-1905) and Rashid 
Rida (1865-1935), stressed the compatibility of Islam with modern science and what 
they saw as the best of Western thoughts (Esposito 1999:53). They argued for a 
selective synthesis of Islam and modern Western thought in that they wished to 
reformulate the Islamic heritage in response to the political, scientific, and cultural 
challenge of the West (Esposito 1999:53). Most reformers wanted to adopt Western 
ideas and technology at the same time as they promoted the ideas of anticolonialism 
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and Muslim unity (Esposito 1999:59). Still, these reformers failed in mobilizing 
people in organizations (Esposito 1999:59), but their ideas have later been used and 
evolved into Muslim nationalism and Islamism. 
Islamist groups emerged in the first half of the twentieth century (Esposito 1988:152). 
The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Jamaat-i-Islami in the Indian subcontinent 
were stronger in their condemnation of the West than secular and Islamic reformers 
(Esposito 1988:153). They believed in the total self-sufficiency of Islam. Western 
secularism and materialism were considered alien and should be rejected (Esposito 
1988:153, Kepel 2002:27). Both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat saw Islam 
as a comprehensive ideology for personal and public life. They “reinterpreted Islamic 
history and tradition to respond to the sociohistorical conditions of the twentieth 
century” (Esposito 1988:155). They were not against a renewal or modernization of 
the Muslim society, but they were convinced that it needed to be rooted in Islamic 
principles and values (Esposito 1988:156). In Burgat’s view the Islamists strive to 
change the rules of the political discourse when they reconnect with an older 
symbolic system (Utvik 1993:208). Still, this caution with using words as 
modernisation does not stop them from promoting such ideas (Utvik 2003:56). Kepel 
agree in that these movements first wanted to adapt to the modern society. But he 
argues that we experienced a shift around the 1970s, when Islamists reacted to the 
marginalisation of religion in the public realm (Kepel 1994:1-2). In Kepel’s view, the 
fight was no longer over Islamic ability to modernise successfully through own 
concepts and heritage.  
The two founding movements chose different approaches in their organization. The 
Muslim Brotherhood grew quickly as a mass movement with support mainly from the 
rural lower class and the middle class (Esposito 1988:155). Contrary, the Jamaat was 
more an elite than a populist organization. The focus was on training a core of 
leaders, and writing down an Islamic ideology (Esposito 1988:155). 
There is no general agreement among scholars in every aspect of the emergence of 
Islamism. Roy and Kepel tend to see the renaissance as a reaction to the reduced 
impact of God and religion in the public realm that the Middle Eastern societies 
experienced after independence. Burgat and Utvik often highlight the political fight 
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over symbols, symbols representing the Muslim and often Arab cultural heritage. 
According to Burgat and Utvik this fight over symbols represents a modern thought 
or way that the Islamists follow. From their view the Islamists are to be looked upon 
as a modernizing force themselves. I would consider Esposito to be somewhere in 
between these two poles, while Guazzone is found closer to Burgat and Utvik’s 
position. 
Regardless of what angle one chooses, it seems hard to explain why the revival of 
Islamic thought took place in the late 1970s. I will argue that other circumstances 
triggered this first explanation.  
2.1.2 Failed expectations 
Even though Islamic movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat had 
emerged in the early twentieth century, it was Arab nationalism that grasped people’s 
attention in the middle of the twentieth century. Egyptian nationalism represented by 
Nasser was to become a symbol of Arab nationalism and independence from the 
West, far beyond the Egyptian borders. The Free Officers and Nasser had planned to 
seize power for a decade when they took action in 1952 (Mansfield 1992:244). Their 
intention was to stop the foreign influence, mainly represented by Britain, to 
eliminate the power of the monarchy and the landlords as well as ending the 
corruption of political life (Mansfield 1992:244). In spite of the overwhelming 
support of the nationalist movements that seized power after independence in most 
Arab states, the nationalists lacked a political platform. After independence, these 
nationalist governments tried different approaches, but socialism was the most 
common ideology. Nasser in Egypt, Bourguiba in Tunisia and the Baath-parties in 
Syria and Iraq were all trying a socialist path to development. Nasser’s success in 
driving the British out of Egypt and establishing control of the Suez Canal, made him 
a hero in the Arab world. Additionally, his politics of neutrality in regard to the West 
and Soviet Union (Mansfield 1992:249) increased his popularity. It was only after the 
Arab-Israeli war in 1967 that the faith in Nasser and Arab nationalism declined. The 
overwhelming superiority of the Israeli army when defeating the Arab alliance in 6 
days shocked the whole Arab world. Nasser died few years later (1970), and a lot of 
trust in Arab nationalism was buried with him (Dekmejian 1985:28-29). Arab 
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nationalism had not helped the Arab states in resolving the conflict with Israel or 
other regional conflicts, as in Lebanon and between Iraq and Iran (Guazzone 1995:8). 
The credibility of Arab nationalism vanished and produced a vacuum (Kepel 
2002:63). Additionally, by the 1970s it had become clear that the socialist strategy 
had not succeeded in providing economic growth and wealth to the people. The 
different states had vast internal problems. Various protests and riots were seen in 
countries like Egypt and Tunisia in the late 1970s (Guazzone 1995:8). The old 
identity crisis reappeared in the Muslim world. Revolutionary socialism, Western 
liberalism and Islamism were all alternatives with various supports. Throughout the 
1970s the Islamic way proved to be the most popular among the population 
(Dekmejian 1985:29). The regimes had tried Western ideas without any success. The 
need to return to more familiar ideas like Islamic tradition and religion spread among 
the people. At the same time the populations were growing and an increased 
urbanization was seen. Unemployment rates were high. The expected economic 
growth was a failure. Additionally, the profit of the Arab oil production did not reach 
the people. The regimes were not capable of providing proper social services to their 
people (Esposito 2003b:72). This general discontent among the people was resulting 
in distrust towards the government. It was in this climate that the Islamists emerged 
as a popular movement. They argued for a return to the Islamic values and morality. 
They criticised the sitting governments and demanded a functioning social service. 
The need for technological and economic development was (and still is) central in the 
political agenda of the Islamists (Utvik 2003:54).  
Additionally the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran had an impact. It made people 
believe in the Islamic cause. The Iranian revolution proved it possible to conquer the 
old corrupt regimes, and helped spreading enthusiasm in the Islamist circles.  
 
One could look upon these two root causes as competing perspectives. I have decided 
to treat these as congruent causes. When addressing the modernity explanation there 
is no good answer for why Islamism should accumulate in the late 1970s. The 
Muslim world has been exposed to modernity through Western influence for a long 
period of time. This is why I believe there was another explanation triggering or 
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affecting this modernity-explanation. The general failure of the social and economical 
politics in the Middle East was evident in the 1970s. People found this as evidence 
for a non-working ‘Westernized’ model in their countries. For many the untried new 
Islamist model seemed worth trying in a period where everything seemed to fail. 
Hence, I believe that general disapproval with the existing regimes and the 
consequences for society made people look in new directions.  
2.2 Contemporary Islamism 
2.2.1 Ideology 
Islamist ideology is based on the conviction that Islamic law, Shari’a, provides an 
embracing and comprehensive system for individual, social and political life. Further, 
the political organization of society must be Islamic to secure a good Muslim society 
(Guazzone 1995:10). Hence, all Islamists have in common the wish to establish an 
Islamic state, based on the Shari’a. Naturally, the organization or movement needs to 
be politically oriented in order to be separated from strictly religious groups, 
emphasising for instance ritualistic or spiritualist behaviour. 
Utvik sums the criteria for being an Islamic movement in the following definition: 
1) “Those who refer to themselves as the Islamic (or Islamist) movement (al-
haraka al-islâmiyya). 
2) They call for the establishment of an Islamic state. The main criterion defining 
such a state is that it should be ruled by the Shari’a, the revealed law of Islam. 
3) They organize themselves into social and political movements in order to 
achieve this aim” (Utvik 1993:200). 
Islamists consider themselves to offer the Islamic solution as a third alternative to 
capitalism and communism (Esposito 2003b:72). “They argue that a modern Western 
bias or orientation, secularism and dependence on western models of development, 
have proven politically inadequate and socially corrosive, undermining the identity 
and moral fabric of Muslim societies” (Esposito 2003b:72). 
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2.2.2 Islamist movements 
Widely put, Islamist movements can be traced back to three geo-cultural trends (Roy 
1994:2). First is the Arab Sunni movement, based on the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
Egyptian ideologue Hassan al-Banna (1906-49). The second is the Indian Sunni 
movement with Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-78), founder of the Pakistani Jama’at-I 
Islami. Finally there is the Arab-Persian Shi’i movement that sees Ayatollah 
Khomeini as their main ideologue (Guazzone 1995:13). 
“Through the decades, Islamism has evolved and diversified both in response to local 
and international changes and as a result of the cross influences of the various 
movements” (Guazzone 1995:13). Shi’i Islamism managed to put forth the first 
Islamic revolution in Iran, but is now marginalized to Iran and Hizbullah in Lebanon. 
The Arab Sunni movement based on the Muslim Brotherhood have experienced a 
split resulting in more radical movements like Hizb al-Tahir, Islamic Jihad, Jama’at 
Islamiia etc. These groups see Sayyed Qutb as their idol, and argue a more violent 
approach to gain influence. In for instance Malaysia and the former Soviet Union 
methods and action of Sunni and Shi’i movements have been mixed (Guazzone 
1995:13).   
Bagader argues that the different circumstances of the 1960s and 1970s, such as 
incomplete modernisation, decline of Arab nationalism, and secularisation of the 
elites, led to responses of different Islamic groups (Bagader 1994:118). He lists 
spiritual groups such as the Sufi-movements, ritualistic groups with emphasis on 
‘Islamic appearances’ (beard, modest dressing, veiling of women etc), revolutionary 
groups demanding immediate change of society, Muslim Brothers’ groups based on 
the teachings of al-Banna, independent intellectual groups, and finally traditional 
Islamic leadership groups of muftis, jurists and professors of Islamic studies (Bagader 
1994:119-120). Even though all of these groups focus on Islam, they do not 
automatically fall into the categorisation of Islamists. As mentioned under 2.2.1 the 
groups have to aim at implementing an Islamic state and accordingly organise 
themselves. Following, I only find that the revolutionary groups and the Muslim 
Brothers’s groups in Bagaders categorisation fit this description. 
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Despite the common goal in establishing an Islamic state, “Islamist movements differ 
in organization, type of political action, historical affiliation, source of ideological 
inspiration, territorial and social diffusion, and legal status in the various national 
contexts” (Guazzone 1995:14). Still, it is possible to place the different movements 
according to (1) how literalist the approach to religious orthodoxy is, and (2) by their 
approach to political action (Guazzone 1995:14). The level of literalist understanding 
distinguishes movements that are considered evolutionist (or pragmatic) from those 
who are more conservative (or fundamentalist) in their understanding of religion. The 
evolutionists tend to see the Shari’a as a universal system of reference values that 
needs to be interpreted and adjusted to the contemporary situation in society 
(Guazzone 1995:14). To what extent they find that interpretation should be used may 
vary among the different movements. Examples of movements that fall into this 
category are the Muslim Brotherhood, En-Nahda in Tunisia, the present Iranian 
regime and the National Islamic Front (NIF) in Sudan (Guazzone 1995:15). This 
approach is believed to have the best ability to meet democratic policy-making. 
“Extensive use of interpretation provides the ideological instrument for potential 
democratic development of these movements and trends” (Guazzone 1995:15). 
However, an evolutionist view provides no guarantee for democratic support.  
In contrast, the conservative movements “feel that religious law, the Shari’a, is an all-
embracing and unchanging system of rules that must be applied, not interpreted” 
(Guazzone 1995:14). The Wahhabi founders of the current Saudi Arabia, and salafi4 
supporters led by Ben Azzouz Zebdha and Hachemi Sahnouni within the Algerian 
FIS5 (Rouadjia 1995:73) constitute examples of this approach.  
These classifications concern only the interpretation of the texts. Hence, how these 
movements feel about political action is a separate issue. Movements that choose a 
revolutionary approach to politics is convinced that the construction of an Islamic 
state must take place “from the top down” (Roy 1994:24). By this is meant that a 
                                              
4 The salafi doctrine is conservative and similar to the approach used in Saudi Arabia. 
5 FIS was founded as a cooperation between different Algerian Islamist groups, accordingly one finds various doctrines 
within the movement. 
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revolutionary and even violent takeover by these groups is needed, where no 
compromise with the existing regime is considered as legitimate (Guazzone 1995:15). 
This revolutionary approach provide small chances for democratic conduct. 
Clandestine groups of the Egyptian Jama’at and the Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami, plus 
various small groups throughout the Arab world fall into this category (Guazzone 
1995:15).  
Contrary, the reformist movements believe that an Islamic state can be built “from the 
bottom up” (Guazzone 1995:15). These movements, like the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt, FIS in Algeria, Sudanese brothers, En-Nahda in Tunisia (Bagader 1994:119) 
and those who operate within the political system, believe that they will succeed 
through political consensus and a gradual change of the social and political 
environment. This policy could be democratic in that the movements accept political 
contest for power. 
These classifications may be useful in gaining a certain overview of the various 
Islamist movements. When desired to go deeper into understanding these movements 
it is necessary to look into the specificities and the national context of each movement 
(Guazzone 1995:16).           
2.2.3 The spread of Islamism 
Though modern Islamism is rooted in Egypt and Pakistan, Islamism is now spread 
from North Africa and the Middle East to Central, South, and Southeast Asia. In 
countries like Iran, Sudan and until recently Afghanistan, Islamist governments have 
seized power and established Islamic states. In countries like Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Yemen and India, Islamists have been allowed to act on the political scene (Burgat 
2003:172). During certain periods, Islamists in Jordan have even been invited to 
participate in government-coalitions. In Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood is not 
accepted as a political party, but members of the movement have been allowed to 
participate as individual candidates. This was also the situation for the Islamists in 
Tunisia in the late 1980s. In for instance Algeria the Islamists were first allowed to 
enter the political scene, but were later repressed after achieving broad popular 
support (Esposito 2003a:1).  
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The spread of Islamist thought have been severe. Many have pointed out that regions 
with a strong Western influence, often through colonisation followed by modern 
secular politics, have experienced more Islamist support. Countries like Egypt, 
Algeria and Tunisia are examples in this case. Countries with a history of 
colonisation have more often experienced a politic of westernization and 
modernisation after independence. When the growth and economic success they were 
hoping for failed to come, many people in these countries blamed the westernization 
of their societies for the hard times. People started searching for alternatives, and 
many looked to Islam for help.   
Islamist support in numbers is always hard to estimate. Because of the semi-legal and 
illegal status of Islamists in many countries, reliable opinion polls do not exist. Still, 
there are some election-figures from the 1980s and 1990s that could give us a hint. 
According to Guazzone (1995), Algerian Islamists (FIS) obtained approximately 50% 
of the votes in administrative and general elections in 1990 and 1991. In Egypt the 
Muslim Brothers have through their alliances with the Labour Party obtained between 
10-20% in the years from 1984 to 1992. Jordanian Islamists raised their support from 
20% in 1989 to 30% in the 1993 elections. In Kuwait the Islamist support in the 1990 
elections were as high as 40%. In the 1992 elections of Lebanon, Hizbullah and 
Jama’a Islamiyya obtained around 10% of the total votes. Independent candidates for 
Tunisian En-Nahda achieved around 13% of the votes in the 1989 elections, which 
were the last elections they were allowed to participate in. Yemen Islamist support 
declined from 25% in 1988 to 17% in the 1993 elections of the unified Yemen 
(Guazzone 1995:31-33).     
In spite of the election-figures one should keep in mind that in many of these 
elections threats and repression have been used from the government to influence the 
result. Likewise, support for the Islamists may sometimes have been the only real 
alternative to the sitting regimes (Guazzone 1995:17). Consequently, this support 
may sometimes be considered as general disapproval with the government, and not as 
sincere support for the Islamists.    
To identify or give an exact profile of the supporters are never easy.  
 27
Modernization often means that modern government and investors focus on urban 
areas. The consequence for the Middle East and North Africa has mostly been a rapid 
urbanization of society where young and poor from smaller towns and rural areas 
move to the larger cities. Their hopes for a better life are often undermined by the 
realities of a life in poverty in the urban slums (Esposito 1999:14). The states were 
not prepared for the large population growth and the urban migration. The shanty 
towns were in lack of a working infrastructure. Instead the religious associations took 
care of these marginalised people providing them with at least some help (Kepel 
1994:24). The shock of modern urban life with its influence of Western culture, 
added together with the difficulties in adjusting to a life far from hometowns, family 
and traditions made people seek comfort in religion. The charitable organisations 
built mosques in the slums long before any state-organised offices and services 
appeared (Kepel 1994:24).  
According to Roy (1994:3), most followers of the Islamists are not ‘traditionalists’. 
They left behind their previous forms of amusements and “the respect for elders and 
for consensus”, when they moved from the villages (Roy 1994:3). Now they are 
confronted with values you find in modern cities such as consumerism and upward 
social mobility (Kepel 2002:66, Roy 1994:3). The problem is that these groups 
seldom get to take part of this ‘new’ world. They are either unemployed or they 
possess menial jobs.  
People from the lower middle class have also joined the Islamists. Those who took 
education experienced bad prospects for a future career, while those who were able to 
get a job often felt the culture shock on a daily basis (Esposito 1999:14).  
The younger generation is particularly strongly represented in the Islamist 
movements (Esposito 2003b:73). In contrast you find very few members recruited 
from the circles of the religious scholars (ulama) (Kepel 1994:31). Instead you find a 
large proportion of university graduates and young professionals from the lower 
middle class recruited from universities and mosques. In the 1970s many Middle 
Eastern governments opened the universities in a “policy of mass education which 
they thought essential to economic takeoff” (Kepel 1994:24-25). But the system was 
not prepared, and soon massive corruptions put and end to equality. Those who could 
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pay got private lessons and a better opportunity to do well. It was in this chaos the 
Islamists entered the campus and arranged free tutoring and other student services 
(Kepel 1994:25). It is usually people with the modern secular faculties of science, 
engineering, education, law and medicine that join the Islamists (Esposito 2003b:73, 
Kepel 1994:32, Utvik 2003:54). These groups do often feel “politically and 
economically disenfranchised or oppressed” (Esposito 2003b:73). Without any 
traditional religious education these students read and interpret the Quran “without 
reference to the learned commentaries of the ulemas and their social inhibitions” 
(Kepel 1994:32). They select quotations from the Quran, which they find in 
accordance with their feelings or a contemporary problem (Kepel 1994:32). 
Scholars such as Roy and Kepel are occupied with the failure of revolutionary 
Islamism (Islamism from above), especially in Sunni Islam (Kepel 1994:32, Roy 
1994:25). This violent approach has not been able to recruit the masses. Roy further 
rules out the Islamist forces as influential in that these groups have not been able to 
change much of the political reality6 in the Middle East and North Africa (Roy 
1994:27). 
Since I am interested in groups that are possibly more in line with democracy (or 
democratic behaviour), I will focus more on Islamists in favour of reform (Islamism 
from the bottom up). Accordingly, I do not agree with the conclusion that Islamism is 
played out and is without impact on the Muslim societies. In my opinion reformist 
Islamists are both important in a civil society-approach, where the members are 
expected to learn democratic behaviour, and when it comes to influencing their own 
societies.  
Burgat tend to draw Roy’s conclusion in doubt. When Roy argues that Islamism has 
lost its ‘original impetus’ (Burgat 2003:161), he refuses to see the evolvement of the 
Islamist movements as natural. While Burgat sees this evolvement as the reality, Roy 
refuses looking upon Islamists through their new policies. Burgat argues that much of 
these differences, when analysing the Islamist discourse, stem from scholars who are 
too attached to the phenomenon of revolutionary Islamism (Burgat 2003:162). The 
                                              
6 As goes for states, regimes and borders. 
 29
reformist dynamics of Islamism has simply been underestimated. However, it is this 
kind of Islamism we witness during elections since these forces have been able to 
express themselves in some countries. And it is also most likely that these reforming 
Islamists are here to stay, in contrast to the more revolutionary Islamists. Through 
civil society organisations the Islamists offer health care, education, poverty advice 
etc, and most importantly they get in contact with the people. They are able to prove 
through these activities that they want to help the population and not only provide 
themselves with power and resources like many of the politicians in this part of the 
world do.         
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3. Democracy 
The term democracy occurred in the English language in the 16th century, but the 
word stems from the Greek demokratia, which derive from demos (people) and 
kratos (rule). Thus a democratic government is based on the people’s rule, in contrast 
to monarchies and aristocracies (Held 1996:1). In order to discuss modern 
democracy, and in this case more specifically the relation between democracy and 
Islam, it seems natural to start the discussion by recalling the original aim of the term 
democracy and to briefly follow the development of the idea. During the second part 
of this discussion I will go deeper into the issue that particularly concerns my focus 
for this dissertation; mainly the place of religion in politics. Finally, the ongoing 
discourse on democracy and Islamism, and their compatibility, will be discussed.    
3.1  What is Democracy? 
Democracy is a concept hard or even impossible to define accurately. There is no 
prevailing understanding of the concept, even though politicians, media and scientists 
of various disciplines use the word constantly. There seem to be just as many 
understandings of the concept as there are people who apply it. Consequently, there is 
little use in picking out one definition to base my analysis upon; hence various 
arguments of importance will be highlighted. An often-used classification of the 
different definitions of democracy is of the classical and the empirical models of 
democracy. The classical definitions are mostly concerned with certain values and 
norms, while the empirical definitions are occupied with the explanation of political 
reality (Jahanbakhsh 2001:6).  
3.1.1 Classical models 
The Athenian democracy has served as an inspiration to modern political thought. Its 
political ideas like equality among citizens, liberty, and respect for the law and justice 
are basic rights in most modern societies today (Held 1996:15). However, I find it 
best to limit this discussion by moving quickly to the modern philosophical debate.  
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Liberalism is not a single idea, but rather a set of ideas where different versions and 
interpretations have flourished through modern history (Held 1996:74). Classical 
liberalism is usually seen as a phenomenon that emerged in England during the 17th 
and 18th century although liberalism was also seen in North America in this period 
(Smith 1984:99). Classical liberalism evolved around claims of religious freedom and 
tolerance, constitutionalism and political rights. Greater freedom for each individual 
was a central goal. This was mostly formulated in a negative sense, emphasising the 
protection of individuals from state power rather than focusing on the individual’s 
right to participate (Smith 1984:99). Hobbes launched the theory of contract, Locke 
wrote about the rule of law with limited authority, and Montesquieu evolved the idea 
of constitutionalism and political freedom (Klemetsdal 2000:13). Central in Locke’s 
idea of society and the state is his regard of the state of nature. He believed that the 
right to dispose one’s own labour and possess property was essential (Held 1996:79). 
By property Locke refers to the right of ‘life, liberty and estate’. In the state of nature 
there are no guaranties that people will respect each others right in regard to property, 
therefore Locke suggests solving this by an agreement in which the society is given 
the right to decide upon a government to secure the right of property (Held 1996:80). 
To Locke, and followers of the liberalistic idea, the right of property and the freedom 
of the individual are the most important values. This is why liberalism focuses on the 
idea of economic freedom and the power of the market just as much as, or even more 
than, political rights. There is no automatic linkage between liberalistic ideas and 
democracy. In Locke’s view, “the creation of a political community or government is 
the burden individuals have to bear to secure their ends” (Held 1996:81). In regard to 
democracy, Locke’s ideas are by no means typically democratic. Political power were 
to be held ‘on trust’ by and for the people, but Locke failed to mention who should be 
regarded as ‘the people’ and under what circumstances ‘trust’ should be given (Held 
1996:81). Still, Locke’s views have been important for the foundation of liberalism 
and prepared the way for the tradition of popular representative government (Held 
1996:81).  
 
 32 
Karl Marx (1818-83) and Friedrich Engels (1820-95) opposed the idea of a ‘neutral’ 
liberal state and ‘free’ market economy, and claimed this would be unrealistic in 
practice in an industrial capitalist world (Held 1996:121). According to Marx, 
liberalism restricts freedom to a minority of the population by focusing on capitalist 
production and its relation to the free market. Marxists argue that freedom in a 
capitalist democracy is purely formal because of the power possessed by those in 
control of the economic sphere (Held 1996:136). This system legitimates the 
exploitation of the capacities, namely the workers (Held 1996:138). Here it is not the 
state that decides the premises for the social order, but the social order that dictates 
the state (Held 1996:136). As long as private ownership exists there will be no 
equality, and to Marx equality is a precondition for freedom and democracy. Only the 
abolition of the capitalist state makes it possible to have equal freedom for everyone. 
Marx says: “Freedom entails the complete democratisation of society as well as the 
state; it can only be established with the destruction of social classes and ultimately 
the abolition of class power in all its forms” (Held 1996:138). Marx did not write in 
detail about what communism should be like, but in his works he revealed some of 
his thoughts about the matter (Held 1996:138). In the two stages of communism, 
normally referred to as socialism and communism, the people would gradually be 
emancipated from politics (Held 1996:140). By this Marx meant that the large and 
slow state-bureaucracy should be as minimal and effective as possible in socialism 
(Held 1996:141) and in communism the society and the state should be fully 
integrated (Held 1996:146).                                                                                                     
3.1.2 Empirical models 
The democratic models by Max Weber (1864-1920) and Joseph Schumpeter (1883-
1950) have by many been categorised as competitive elitism. Their conception of 
political life did in little degree enhance democratic participation and individual or 
collective development (Held 1996:157). Democracy was a restrictive concept, which 
was seen as a tool to choose the decision-makers and limiting their excesses. Weber 
argues that in a society with competing values there is little or no possibility of 
agreement on a specific set of morality that political life will rest upon. Accordingly, 
“the liberal polity can only be defended on procedural grounds – grounds which 
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emphasize its importance as a mechanism for promoting the ‘competition of values’ 
and ‘freedom of choice’ in a rationalized world” (Held 1996:161). Weber criticises 
direct democracy as an impossible model of political regulation. He argues that direct 
democracy requires equality of all participants, which is unrealistic in a 
heterogeneous modern society (Held 1996:163). Weber saw a system with capitalist 
economy, parliamentary government and a competitive party system as desirable 
(Held 1996:168). He argued for parliamentary government because of the openness 
this would provide securing the “expression of competing ideas and interests” as well 
as functioning as a “testing ground for aspiring leaders” (Held 1996:168). In addition, 
parliamentary discussions give opportunity for compromise. To Weber these criteria 
make parliament a “mechanism for the preservation of the competition of values” 
(Held 1996:169). Weber portrays democracy as a testing ground for potential leaders 
where you find those who are best fit to get elected. To Weber choice in politics is 
“between leadership democracy with a [party] ‘machine’ and leaderless democracy, 
namely, the rule of professional politicians without a calling” (Held 1996:172). 
Weber’s support for representative democracy was mostly due to his belief in the 
importance of competent leaders than of the concern for democratic values. The 
democratic process “established a form of ‘elected dictatorship’” which Weber saw 
as highly beneficial (Held 1996:172).  
 
Schumpeter did in many aspects agree with Weber. Democracy was for him a 
political method to find suitable leaders who were capable of deciding in politics on 
behalf of the people (Held 1996:179). Hence, for Schumpeter democratic politics is 
steered ultimately by competing elites (Held 1996:207). Schumpeter saw 
bureaucratization as “basis of modern management and democratic government” 
(Held 1996:183). Democracy and bureaucracy was compatible with each other, and 
both capitalist and socialist organisation (Held 1996:183). He saw the idea of 
classical democracy as unrealistic (Held 1996:185,191). He criticized the notion of a 
‘common good’ that all people would agree on “by the force of rational argument” 
(Held 1996:185). The interpretation of the ‘common good’ is bound to differ in 
modern diverse societies, he claimed. The classical meaning of democracy as in ‘rule 
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by the people’ was not an option. The people were only to accept or refuse the people 
who ruled (Held 1996:180). According to Schumpeter, the people themselves were 
not capable of understanding politics, the masses were not educated and therefore 
ignorant and in lack of sound judgement (Held 1996:181). He further argues that the 
‘popular will’ is a social construct with no base in reality. Politicians try to make 
‘popular will’ the motive of political processes, but to Schumpeter it is rather the 
product of these processes (Held 1996:187). 
     
In the mid 20th century pluralists were examining political processes in their 
contemporary societies. These pluralists were occupied with the “dynamics of group 
politics” (Held 1996:199). According to Dahl, essential in the pluralistic theory, 
citizen’s control of politicians can work if there are regular elections and political 
competition among parties, groups and individuals (Held 1996:205). Thinkers such as 
Madison, Mill and Tocqueville have expressed the fear of the power of the ‘demos’, 
that the majority will take no considerations to the minority. Dahl on the contrary 
believes that no tyrannous majority will rise because elections express the preferences 
of various competitive groups, rather than the wishes of a firm majority. His concept 
of polyarchy, the open contest for electoral support among a large proportion of the 
adult population, ensures competition among groups of interest, which for Dahl 
represents the safeguarding of democracy (Held 1996:206). The social prerequisites 
of a functional polyarchy are to Dahl: consensus on the rules of procedure, consensus 
on the range of policy options and on the legitimate scope of political activity (Dahl 
1956:135, Held 1996:207). Protection against tyranny and protection of the minorities 
is according to Dahl to be found in these non-constitutional factors, the social 
prerequisites of democracy (Dahl 1956:135). He found value in the democratic 
process when “rule by the multiple minority oppositions” were achieved (Held 
1996:206). This is in contrast to the well known “sovereignty of the majority” (Held 
1996:206). In effect, Dahl’s model of polyarchy does not secure the equal distribution 
of control with political decision-making nor does it secure equal political ‘weight’ 
among groups and individuals (Held 1996:208).  
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Two schools were growing in the 1950s and 1960s, The New Right and The New 
Left. The New Right stated, “political life, like economic life, is a matter of 
individual freedom and initiative.”(Held 1996:253). The state bureaucracy should 
keep the expenses and the activities down to a minimal level, at the same time as the 
government should be strong and enforce law and order. The classical conflict 
between liberalism and democracy is evident when the New Right seeks limiting 
democratic use of state power (Held 1996:254). “For them, the contemporary state is 
a great Leviathan which threatens the foundations of liberty and, accordingly, must be 
radically ‘rolled back’” (Held 1996:254). Friedrich Hayek, central to New Right 
thought, expresses his scepticism towards the ‘demos’. The people should be 
“constrained in its actions by general rules, there is no guarantee that what it 
commands will be good or wise” (Held 1996:257). Hayek argues that liberty is only 
achievable if the power of the state is regulated by law. Hence, it is easy to criticise 
this view as limiting of the democratic debates and control (Held 1996:263).  
The New Left questioned the idea that individuals are ‘free and equal’ in 
contemporary liberal democracies, and they appealed for more participation of the 
people in politics (Held 1996:264). Pateman and Macpherson are spokespersons of 
this view. “Inequalities of class, sex and race substantively hinder the extent to which 
it can legitimately be claimed that individuals are free and equal” (Held 1996:265). If 
you explore systematically the ways asymmetries of power and resource impinge 
upon the meaning of liberty and equality in daily relations, you will discover that 
massive numbers of individuals are restricted systematically from participating 
actively in political and civil life. Formal rights are considered of limited value if they 
fail to work in real life (Held 1996:264). They suggest two sets of changes to come 
closer to a participatory democracy. The state must be democratised by making 
parliament, state bureaucracies and political parties more open and accountable. In 
addition new forms of struggle at the local level must ensure that society, as well as 
the state, is subject to procedures which ensure accountability (Held 1996:266). 
3.1.3 Limiting the theory: construction of a dichotomy 
All of these models consist of interesting and important elements for the democratic 
discussion. However, in an analysis it might be easier and clearer to operate with 
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more specific alternatives. To cover all the elements of such a broad spectre of 
models, as referred to in the previous discussion, could provide unclear results. 
As Østerud (1995:169) points out, there is a difference between regarding democracy 
as a model for ‘the good society’ and seeing democracy purely as procedures or 
mechanisms. The problem with viewing democracy as a model for society is the lack 
of clarity this brings. What one considers to be good in a society differ depending on 
who one asks (Østerud 1995:169).  
In contrast, procedural democracy stresses the rules for decision as the legitimizing 
force. When the rules and mechanisms for decision are agreed upon and followed, the 
decision will be considered democratic regardless of its content. This procedural 
democracy would be similar to formal democracy. Formal democracy has been 
criticized for not being able to secure a real democratic outcome (Østerud 1995:175). 
Democratic values are not necessarily realised in society.  
The New Left has an important point when they stress the difference between formal 
and substantive democracy. If a state fails to secure all of its citizens’ real rights, the 
New Left finds it difficult to talk about democracy and popular sovereignty. Marx 
and the New Left base much of their critique of liberal democracy on this particular 
issue. They want democratic rights to be equal for the whole society. In a substantive 
democracy one has to focus on the realisation of certain values. These values could 
typically be the principles of popular sovereignty, freedom and equality7. To achieve 
this form it has been suggested that the people need to participate on a broader basis 
during the decision-making. Greater openness and accountability are other suggested 
measures. 
In an attempt to make the conditions for the analysis clearer I will narrow the 
alternatives down to a dichotomy. I will by no means argue for such a simplification 
of the democratic discussion in general, but in my specific case this will clarify the 
argumentation to come. My democratic dichotomy will contain the terms formal 
democracy and substantive democracy based on democratic values.  
                                              
7 I will get back to the discussion on these values under 3.4. 
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Formal democracy will in this context comprise a system based on electoral and 
procedural mechanisms, and effective institutions for decision-making. Contributors 
to such a system would typically be Schumpeter, Weber, Dahl/pluralists and the New 
Right. Simultaneously I will stress that I do not regard these contributors’ models as 
completely in accordance with each other. I only find some similar trends on the issue 
of describing democracy.  
Likewise I base the substantive democracy-perspective on a wish to define 
democracy as a broader model of society, most importantly based on real popular 
influence and respecting the values of popular sovereignty, freedom and equality. I 
have linked this view to the critique of formal democracy, defining this perspective as 
more focused on actual fulfilment of the democratic values in society in general. A 
Marxist view is on some issues in accordance with this perspective, but most 
dominantly the New Left argues in this direction. However, I do not view this 
dichotomy as strictly Western. I believe the principles in use are general, with 
possibility to work in various societies.      
 
In addition, many of the empirical models can be criticized because they are based on 
contemporary societies. These thoughts and methods are not necessarily adaptable to 
different societies, and accordingly they may be inadequate as theoretical ‘truths’. In 
this critique it is easy to draw attention to the role of Christianity and its influence on 
the development of democratic thinking. Religion has been of great concern for many 
of the theorists. Their conclusions have been based upon concrete historical events, 
such as the economic abuse by the medieval churches, along with other adjustments 
to the specific Christian religion. Have these influences from Western societies and 
Christianity made democracy inaccessible to societies with other religions? The 
answer to this question will probably vary according to who you ask and upon which 
principles they base their analysis. I believe that the central issue when discussing 
Islamic societies and democracy is to find out what place religion may have in 
politics without violating the most important democratic principles.   
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3.2  The question of Religion 
When following the development of the democratic models treated earlier in this 
chapter, there is a clear tendency of secularisation in politics. In addition, scholars of 
the mid-twentieth century predicted that modernization8 would lead to a decline of 
religion in public life (Sisk 1992:3). Apparently the historical development of politics 
did not fulfil this prediction. In most parts of Western Europe religion is not a vital 
political issue, but in the USA religious issues are an important part of politics. In the 
Middle East, religion is used both as a means of opposition, and as a means to 
legitimate governments.      
When discussing religion in relation to democracy it is important to establish why 
religion in the public sphere is seen as a problem. The overall consideration should be 
on democracy’s most evident principles – freedom and equality. The question derived 
from this is whether the presence of religion in public politics violates the principles 
of freedom and equality. Many seem to promote secularism as the answer to the 
democratic challenges we see in regard to religion. But there is no agreed definition 
of secularism and the concept is used in different ways in different discussions. 
Hence, the different definitions of secularism may protect or violate in various ways 
the democratic principles.                                                                   
In the following, the views of different scholars will be treated in regard to their 
position towards secularism’s place in liberal democracies. I will use the 
classifications of Charles Taylor as a departing point, and use this classification when 
discussing the other scholars.  
 
3.2.1 Secularism 
Charles Taylor argues that secularism is by most seen as when the state distances 
itself from the established religions, or when the state is considered neutral between 
religions (Taylor 1998:31). However, there are more to secularism. First, secularism 
is acknowledged as a product of Christian civilization because of its evolving in 
                                              
8 Modernization in this context is meant to be the result or a ‘state’ in which society will be, after the industrial revolution, 
urbanization, interdependence in world economic relations and the revolution of communications.   
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Western history. This has made many non-Western countries reluctant to approve 
secularism as a universal idea (Taylor 1998:31). Many Muslims tend to see 
secularism as an alien form which should not be imposed on their culture. To the 
extreme, secularism has been looked upon as a continuation of the crusades (Taylor 
1998:31). Taylor acknowledges that secularism has Christian roots, but he sees no 
reason to limit its application to post-Christian societies.                                      
Taylor believes that secularism is required for democracy in religiously diverse 
societies (Taylor 1998:46). He argues the need of a sort of common identification 
among people to achieve a successful democracy (Taylor 1998:44). This patriotism 
should help the citizens to identify with the polity and ensure that the people are 
“willing to give of oneself for its sake” (Taylor 1998:44). This common identification 
should not derive from religion; at least this goes for religiously diverse societies. If 
there is no secularisation in politics and religion is used as a legitimate identification 
(basis) towards the state, the problem with minority groups will rise. The religious 
majority will be able to impose their will on the minorities resulting in lack of respect 
and trust in the state from the unheard minorities (Taylor 1998:45-46).  
 
Taylor operates with three different approaches to secularisation: the common ground 
strategy, the independent political ethic, and the overlapping consensus. These 
approaches differ in their basis for secularisation and according to Taylor this affects 
the outcome or their ability to work. It is in their basis or argumentation for 
secularisation that Taylor finds evidence for why secularisation may work in non-
Christian societies.                                                                                                      
The common ground strategy aims at establishing a certain ethic of peaceful 
coexistence and political order. This is based on doctrines common to all Christian 
sects or even all who believe in the existence of God (Taylor 1998:33). “The goal is 
not to make religion less relevant to public life and policy, but to prevent the state 
from backing one confession rather than another” (Taylor 1998:35). The direction 
that Taylor calls the independent political ethic, suggests that people are to abstract 
themselves from their religious beliefs for purposes of a political morality (Taylor 
1998:34). The people should make an independent ground their basis for living 
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together. This is in line with Hobbes who says that religion is irrelevant to the public 
sphere. “In a private realm, the believer can and must do what conscience demands, 
but he commits no sin in respecting publically-established forms and ceremonies” 
(Taylor 1998:34). In this sense, the independent ethic-logic can “lead to the extrusion 
of religion altogether from the public domain” (Taylor 1998:35). This is in contrast to 
the common ground strategy which has no goal or whish to make religion less 
relevant to public life and politics (Taylor 1998:35). Taylor argues that while the 
common ground theory must be rejected because it assumes that the citizens share 
some religious foundation, the independent ethic trusts that the people share a non-
religious ground which according to Taylor is both unrealistic and dangerous in the 
sense that it may lead to the tyrannical attempt to impose some people’s philosophies 
on others (Taylor 1998:37-38)  To Taylor the overlapping consensus is the only 
approach that recognises that there will be no agreed basis (Taylor 1998:38). The 
overlapping consensus aims only at acceptance for certain political principles, but 
rules out the possibility of agreement on the basis for these principles. The respect of 
diversity in society and in peoples understanding is considered important (Taylor 
1998:38). By rejecting the first approach on the basis of a common Christian ground 
and by placing the independent ethic approach as impossible to use, Taylor bases his 
argumentation for the use of secularism in non-Christian societies on the use of the 
overlapping consensus approach. 
  
Taylor’s overlapping consensus draws heavily on Rawls’ thinking. Convergence is 
needed and should result in a set of politico-ethical principles and goods. A charter of 
rights must bee included with connection to citizenship (Taylor 1998:48). The 
political ethic will be a democratic one securing popular sovereignty as the basis for 
legitimacy. Political freedom will further be a valued principle. The core 
understanding of the overlapping consensus is that there are more than one set of 
valid reasons for signing on to it (Taylor 1998:49). “We converge on some political 
principles, but not on our background reasons for endorsing them” (Taylor 1998:51). 
Taylor gives the example of ‘the right to life’, meaning a set of rights guaranteeing 
against arbitrary arrest of punishment and the right of free exercise. These rights can 
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be argued for from an Enlightenment-inspired perspective of the dignity of human 
beings as rational agents. In contrast, these rights will by a Christian viewpoint be 
based on the thought that humans are made in the image of God (and you should not 
destroy what God wants). A Buddhist would probably argue for these rights out of an 
ethical demand for non-violence (Taylor 1998:49). The conclusion must be that there 
is convergence on respecting the integrity and freedom of human beings, in spite of 
diverging underlying reasons for this respect. But to distinguish the agreed ethic from 
the underlying reasons may not always be easy. The problem lies in the 
implementation of these rights. The same rights may be used differently when set 
against the background of these views. Interpretation will be a problem when there 
are several such backgrounds (Taylor 1998:50). The abortion debates in some 
Western societies make a good example of the problem with interpretation. Taylor is 
convinced that societies applying the overlapping consensus will experience this 
conflict more often (Taylor 1998:50). To make compromises between two or more 
views on the political arena should according to Taylor be expected, and considered 
normal. 
Rawls’ understanding was that people could agree on acting together on some basis, 
but they did not see this as morally binding. Taylor disagrees with this understanding, 
arguing that overlapping consensus will hold if we feel morally bound to the 
convergent principles (Taylor 1998:51). Rawls further writes about the converging on 
justice as guides for action, but he also adds the logical explanation of these 
principles. According to Taylor, this attempt to explain the converging principles has 
nothing to do with the model of overlapping consensus. The whole point here is 
exactly to distance oneself from the underlying justification of the principles (Taylor 
1998:52). He sums up his view with the slogan: “Let people subscribe for whatever 
reasons they find compelling, only let them subscribe” (Taylor 1998:52).  
A paradox is that the single background justification will no longer work for 
secularism itself. The essence of secularism lies in the principles of equality and 
inclusion (Taylor 1998:52). This requires a sort of distance between state and 
religious institutions, but there is no single formula on how to do this or to what 
extent they need to be separated. In regard to state funding of religious schools “one 
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may decide that separation forbids the funding of confessional schools out of taxes” 
(Taylor 1998:52). Still, another option may be to give economically support to all of 
these schools on a broad and fair basis. “To insist on one formula, as the only one 
consistent with ‘liberal’ principles is precisely to erect one background justification 
as supreme, and binding on all, thus violating the essential point of overlapping 
consensus”(Taylor 1998:52). According to Taylor, there need to be some sort of 
separation between state and ‘church’ on the institutional level. Still, he opens for 
religious background argumentation when deciding political matters. The important 
point is that the citizens agree on some principles regarding political work.    
                                                   
Many seem to make secularism a prerequisite for democracy. Michael Walzer is 
among these. He writes in Pluralism, Justice and Equality that “Democratic 
citizenship is not available where there is no secular state…” (Walzer 1995:288). 
Walzer sees liberalism as “a certain way of drawing the map of the social and 
political world” (Walzer 1984:315). To set up walls between different spheres is 
according to Walzer the core of liberalism. The most famous of these walls is the one 
separating church and state. The aim is to create a sphere of religious activity “into 
which politicians and bureaucrats may not intrude” (Walzer 1984:315). Walzer 
argues that the separation should encompass most institutions of society like church, 
universities, market, family etc. He believes that the art of separation is both morally 
and politically necessary “adaptations to the complexities of modern life” (Walzer 
1984: 319). According to Walzer, a modern society enjoys freedom and equality 
when “success in one institutional setting isn’t convertible into success in another” 
(Walzer 1984:321). Walzer’s view may be considered as an independent ethic 
approach. Even though he believes in the protection of religion from the state and 
vice versa, his main point is that religion should be kept away from politics.  He 
writes that churches are for instance the result of agreements among individuals. 
Walzer do not believe that religious freedom, as he sees it in a separation view, is a 
character of Judeo-Christian religiosity (Walzer 1984:324). The state’s relation to the 
church in a separated society is as “the builder and the guardian of the walls”, 
protecting the church from tyrannical interference (Walzer 1984:327).  
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In the book Religion in the public square Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff 
present the views they consider the most important in the democratic debate on 
religion and politics. Audi discusses the liberal position which in his view calls for 
the separation of religion and politics, while Wolterstorff argues from a more 
theologically oriented position that religion is indispensable to the vitality of 
pluralistic democracy (Audi&Wolterstorff 1997:ix).                
Audi’s position is that a liberal democracy must protect religious liberty. 
Additionally, the government in a liberal democracy must avoid the promotion of any 
particular religion. These arguments justify, according to Audi, the separation of 
church and state (Audi 1997:2). In any full-blooded liberal version of the separation 
view, he argues, there are three basic principles:                                                                                   
In the liberitarian principle the state must permit the practice of any religion. 
According to the equalitarian principle, the state may not give preference to one 
religion over another.                                                                                                            
The neutrality principle argues that the state should neither favour or disfavour 
religion. This goes both between religions and between religious and non-religious. 
In defending the libertarian principle Audi states that freedom is required for 
democracy. Hence, a free and democratic society could use a set of framework 
securing religious liberty. Audi suggests this could be: 
1) Freedom of religious belief in that no one, including the state, can forcibly 
inculcating religious beliefs in the general population (Audi 1997:4).     
2) Freedom of worship enhancing the right of peaceable religious assembly and 
prayers (Audi 1997:4). 
3) Freedom to engage in the rites and rituals of one’s religion, unless these 
activities violate certain basic moral rights (Audi 1997:5). 
Audi argues that the equalitarian principle is needed to protect citizens against 
government discrimination (Audi 1997:6). If a government tends to favour one 
religion in particular, people may feel pressured to do the same or limit their practice 
of their true religion. The state’s preference of one religion over another may result in 
different opportunities for the citizens to exercise political power. This preference 
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may also lead to the ratification of certain laws that is based upon one particular 
religion (Audi 1997:6)                                                                                                                        
The neutrality principle is meant to protect especially the non-religious. Audi lists 
several practices by the state that can give preferences to religious people. Among 
these are: mandatory prayer sessions in public schools, religious exemptions from 
combat duty, religious eligibility requirements for adopting children, preference in 
filling government posts, and statutory roles for religious institutions or their 
representatives in government (Audi 1997:6-7). These practices may all lead to 
favour religious versus non-religious people.  
According to Audi, 3 problems can arise in such a situation:                                                                  
In societies where there is a majority of some religion this is likely to dominate 
legislation and policy affecting religion. Secondly, religious disagreements are likely 
to polarize the government more than secular issues. And finally, there is a danger of 
getting into a situation where the government would like to influence the church or 
other religious communities. This can be done by setting criteria as for what counts as 
being religious and soon groups will try to fill these criteria to establish advantages or 
financial support (Audi 1997:8). To Audi the separation should encompass “both the 
level of church and state and the political conduct of individuals” (Audi&Wolterstorff 
1997:ix). It would be tempting to accuse Audi of being a supporter of the common 
ground approach since he is occupied with the problems that arise when the state is 
backing one religion on the dispense of others. But Audi is clear in his concern 
regarding the equality of non-religious and this places him closer to the independent 
political ethic characteristic. Further, he underlines the indispensable role of secular 
reasoning as the basis for democratic decisions (Audi 1997b:168). This can easily be 
compared with Taylor’s characteristic of independent political ethic.  
  
3.2.2 Other possibilities 
Wolterstorff argues that “religion and politics should not be separated either at the 
church-state level or in political interactions among individuals” (Audi&Wolterstorff 
1997:x). The departing point of Wolterstorff’s argumentation is the notion made by 
many liberal democracy theorists that “a good citizen of a liberal democracy will 
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refrain from allowing religious reasons to be determinative when deciding and 
debating political issues of certain sorts” (Wolterstorff 1997:69). Wolterstorff, 
however, questions this notion as a requirement in political debate in a liberal 
democracy. According to Wolterstorff, liberal democracy is when governance are 
able to secure “equal protection under law for all people, equal freedom under law for 
all citizens, and neutrality on the part of the state with respect to the diversity of 
religious and comprehensive perspectives” (Wolterstorff 1997:70). Additionally, this 
system of law rests upon the citizens’ right to equal voice, often exercised by voting 
for office. Wolterstorff sees this system of liberal democracy as an ideal type that is 
impossible to live up to. Consequently, societies can only approach this ideal type 
(Wolterstorff 1997:70).                                                                                          
Wolterstorff refers to the liberal position as his opponent. The liberal position sees 
the goal of political action as justice. Additionally, people’s religious conviction are 
not to be the base of their opinions. People are to find principles derived from an 
independent source when deciding in politics (Wolterstorff 1997:73). The different 
liberal positions are thus united in the principle of a restraint on the use of religious 
reasons in deciding upon political issues (Wolterstorff 1997:75). Wolterstorff finds 
these restraints as paradoxical as they violate against the principle of equal freedom 
(Wolterstorff 1997:77). To Wolterstorff the liberal position is not realistic. It is not 
possible to control people’s reasons for taking a specific position in politics. You can 
not force them to use independent sources, and it is impossible to define what these 
sources are (Wolterstorff 1997:111).  
Wolterstorff’s alternative to the liberal position is the consocial position. This is 
according to Wolterstorff in harmony with the idea of liberal democracy 
(Wolterstorff 1997:81). The consocial position agrees with the liberal position in that 
the goal of political discussion and action is political justice (Wolterstorff 1997:115). 
Still, the consocial position rejects the need of an independent source and wants no 
moral restraints on the use of religious reasons. Second, the consocial position 
interprets the neutrality requirement as the need of the state to be impartial when it 
comes to religion. It is not necessary to separate religion from politics (Wolterstorff 
1997:115). He believes that there is a good chance for discrimination if religion is 
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separated from the state. For instance, if the state does not support religious schools 
this would be discriminating to those who want their children to go to these schools. 
Wolterstorff believes the secular state is partial with the non-religious schools in this 
matter, and the only way of being impartial is to support all schools no matter 
which/what religion or principles that they are based upon. To Wolterstorff it is clear 
that the separation principle is not compatible with the principle of equal freedom 
when it comes to religion (Wolterstorff 1997:115-116).  
When comparing Wolterstorff’s consocial position with the classifications of Charles 
Taylor there are some resemblance with the overlapping consensus. Wolterstorff 
agrees with Taylor in that it is impossible to force people to separate from their 
convictions and use independent sources or ethics. You can not really make people 
change their set of thinking and reasoning. Obviously Wolterstorff is occupied with 
the destiny of the different religious communities. He is genuinely concerned of the 
religious being discriminated in a secular system. In contrast, Taylor is in favour of a 
secular system. While opening for other solutions as to what degree religion and 
politics should be separated, Taylor is never in support of a total dissolving of the 
separation of political and religious institutions. In comparing to Taylor’s model, 
Wolterstorff is operating with a false dichotomy. He believes that either there is 
secularism as in Audi’s understanding, both institutional and in political debate, or 
there is no secularism at all. Taylor on the contrary overcame this contradiction when 
he launched his model. He argues for institutional separation of state and religion 
while permitting and sustaining people’s right to use any religious argumentation to 
agree on politics.   
 
Both Audi and Wolterstorff have used the USA as the basis for their discussions. The 
USA is clearly a heterogeneous society, this goes even for religion. The 
argumentation is heavily based on this experience or the assumption that the different 
religions are strongly represented in society. Taylor’s article is ‘neutral’, but it was 
presented in a book about India – which must be considered a strongly religious and 
diverse society. Many would agree with the notion that a state that supports or takes 
side with only one religion in a religiously divided society is not ideal. The risk of 
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violating the religious freedom of the people as well as treating people unequally on 
the basis of their religious conviction is clearly present in such a state. The question 
that needs to be posed is whether this argumentation works when dealing with 
religiously homogenous states. Will a population that is close to homogeneous in the 
matter of religion feel that their rights of freedom and equal treatment are violated? 
Taylor stresses that he is writing about religiously diverse societies when he is 
arguing for secular solutions. Unfortunately he is not following up how he sees more 
homogenous societies in this relation. But the very fact that he is stressing that his 
thoughts concerns religiously diverse societies (Taylor 1998:46, 53) gives us a hint 
that he might see things differently in homogenous societies. Audi admits that the 
’prohibition’ of a government-established religion is not a requirement for every 
democratic system. In the Western parts of Europe the religion of the state is often 
proclaimed in a constitution (Audi 1997:2). No-one would argue that these countries 
are not proper democracies because they have a ’state religion’. It may be useful to 
consider each democracy’s population, and in many countries the population is more 
or less homogenous in the question of religion. Would state-imposed religion then be 
violating the principles of freedom and equality? Evidently this homogenity is not 
absolute. Hence, the possibility that some groups might feel that their rights are being 
violated by the state is present. This is why a country with a proclaimed religion 
needs to protect, by law, those who do not share this religion’s convictions. As 
mentioned earlier Michael Walzer supports the idea that secularism is a requirement 
for democracy. At the same time he sees the possibility of a morally just system in 
so-called religious states. “Religious identity replaces citizenship, and while this 
identity has its own inclusiveness (it rules out considerations of race, ethnicity, and 
class) the borders it establishes are different from those of the state” (Walzer 
1995:288). To make a system like this just would be possible if autonomy were 
granted all the other religious communities, he argues. Walzer points out that 
reciprocity has been fairly successful in Muslim states in the past. The Jewish 
communities of medieval Islam achieved autonomy, and in the Ottoman Empire the 
millet system secured other religious communities (Walzer 1995:289). The millet 
system was based on Islamic law which defines Christians and Jews as ‘protected 
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people’ because Islam believes these three religions share the same God (Vikør 
1993:188). The system allowed the different religious minorities to set up their own 
courts regulating family- and religious laws (Vikør 1993:188-189). A system with 
such protection of the different religions will in some ways meet the requests for 
equality and freedom to the people. But if this is enough is hard to say.  
 
Another dilemma that will rise in these so-called religious homogeneous societies is 
to what extent people are practicing their religion. Obviously we will find a split 
within every religious society between those who consider themselves just belonging 
to a particular religion, and those who are fully practicing this religion at every level. 
In fact, the difference between people belonging to the same religion may be huge in 
for instance how they interpret and practice their religion. In my opinion, there are no 
homogeneous societies today. This makes it possible to use Taylor’s overlapping 
consensus in every society. By treating the different degrees of religiosity within a so-
called religiously homogeneous society the same way as in religious diverse societies, 
it would be possible to find compromises and establish mutual respect between the 
different standings.     
3.3  Islamism and Democracy – the discourse. 
There has in recent years been a debate on the compatibility of Islam and democracy. 
Samuel Huntington gave this discussion a boost when he wrote “The Clash of 
Civilizations?” in 1993. Much of the debate since then has been on the futility of 
using such general terms as both Islam and democracy. The discourse reflects the 
difference in use of these concepts as well as a massive response to Huntington from 
scholars specialising in Islamic thought and society. I will in the following focus on 
Islamism and democracy.  
Huntington argues in The Clash of Civilizations? that “the fundamental source of 
conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. 
The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be 
cultural” (Huntington 1993:22). He further explains that “a civilization is thus the 
highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people 
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have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species” (Huntington 
1993:24). As Huntington sees the political conflict potential, it is the Islamic 
civilisation and the West that are most likely to clash. These civilisations have 
already been in conflict for 1300 years and that is not likely to decline (Huntington 
1993:31-32). According to Huntington, these differences in civilisations will also 
have an impact on democratisation. “Modern democratic government originated in 
the West” (Huntington 1993:41). “Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, 
constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free 
markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, 
Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures” (Huntington 1993:40). 
Consequently, Huntington makes democracy dependent on certain cultural 
prerequisites. Huntington’s theories have been lively debated and criticised.  
 
In contrast to Huntington, Robert W. Hefner is convinced that democracy can evolve 
in different cultures. He claims that “the social conditions of democracy’s possibility” 
is increasingly important to comparable politics (Hefner 1998a:5). There is “a 
heightened awareness of the multicultural nature of the contemporary world, and the 
need to attend to this pluralism when considering democracy’s prospects” (Hefner 
1998a:5). Hefner asks: “Can ideas of human rights and democratic participation take 
hold in cultures whose ideas of personhood are premised on values other than those 
of liberal individualism?” (Hefner 1998a:5). Hefner stresses civil society as a social 
prerequisite of plural democracy (Hefner 1998a:5). Civil society is an arena of clubs, 
associations, unions etc that is beyond the family and outside the state. “This tissue of 
social ties, civil theorists assume, mediates between the household and the state so as 
to provide citizens opportunities for learning democratic habits of free assembly, non-
coercive dialogue, and socioeconomic initiative”(Hefner 1998a:6). Instead of liberal 
democracy Hefner has chosen to use the expression democratic civility which derives 
from Enlightenment experiences in civility (Hefner 1998a:9). Democratic civility is 
explained with emphasis on values such as equality, freedom and tolerance. He 
claims that even though the discussion on democratic civility is global there is no 
unitary meaning and practice of the concept (Hefner 1998b:317). Hefner points out 
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that there have been several examples of good democratic experiences in non-western 
civilisations and there are also examples on non-working democracies in Western 
civilisation (Hefner 2000:4-5). It all depends on local variations. On different levels 
strong local organisation has been found in various cultures. Hefner mentions 
Indonesia as an example where Muslims have a history of intellectual and 
organisational pluralism (Hefner 1998a:21). Muslims in Indonesia have wide 
experience with the type of organising we refer to as civil society. The Dutch colonial 
power held Islam strictly separated from the state. This helped to create an Islamic 
tradition of grass-roots association and civic independence within the country. Hefner 
views it as a mistake “to take liberal philosophy as the best guide to the values of 
civil-democratic practice” (Hefner 1998a:25). He argues that in both USA and 
Europe9, “civil democrats have struck different balances between individual and 
groups rights, and among the triplicate values of equality, freedom and tolerance” 
(Hefner 1998a:25)  
By questioning liberal individualism, as the only cultural possibility where human 
rights can take hold, and by thinking differently about the place and possible benefits 
of public religion, the conditions of democracy’s cross-cultural possibility has 
become an interesting field of study, he argues (Hefner 2000:5).  
 
John L. Esposito and John O. Voll have written numerous books and articles on the 
religious resurgence in the Muslim world. In their joint work, Islam and Democracy, 
they try to explain and relate the two currently strongest trends: islamization and 
democratization. Esposito and Voll find the potential democratic resources of the 
Islamic tradition and the ability of the new Islamic movements to meet the demands 
of Islamic authenticity and popular democratic participation, the most important 
issues within this context (Esposito & Voll 1996:7). Esposito and Voll are positive to 
democratization in the Muslim world. In that the democratic concept is highly 
contested among Western countries and scholars, Esposito and Voll believe that 
democratization is not to be looked upon as a single model for Westerners to export 
                                              
9 Especially the pillar-system of the Netherlands  
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(Espositio & Voll 1996:17). They criticize the West, and especially USA, for giving 
this impression when discussing global democratization. Esposito and Voll make 
Marx an example of alternatively Western democratic thinking (Espositio & Voll 
1996:17). They do not take a stand whether they support the Marxist view of 
democracy, but they use it to contest the notion of a single Western model of liberal 
democracy. According to the authors, it is much more useful to see the possibilities 
for societies with other historical and cultural heritage to adopt their own democratic 
version on the basis of their own symbols and traditions. Hence, they are in strong 
opposition to Huntington who concluded that the cultural conditions in Islam made it 
impossible to develop democracy in these societies. Esposito and Voll point out that 
the development of democracy in the West involved combinations of previous anti-
democratic institutions along with the newer democratic ones. After some time 
Western societies reconceptualized their older institutions in that they became more 
democratic while still holding on to the historical names (Esposito & Voll 1996:22). 
Esposito and Voll underline the importance of the Islamic principles of Tawheed 
(Unity of God), Risalat (Prophethood) and Khilafat (Caliphate) (Esposito & Voll 
1996:23). The reconceptualization of these concepts are not supported by a united 
Muslim leadership, but according to Esposito and Voll they are essential for 
understanding the foundations of democratisation in the Muslim world (Esposito & 
Voll 1996:23). In short, the principle of Tawheed is normally understood in political 
philosophy as “there can be only one sovereign and that is God” (Esposito & Voll 
1996:23). Hence, many Islamists seem to take different positions in this matter. Some 
reject democracy on the basis of Tawheed while others want to slightly reframe 
democracy in accordance with this principle (Esposito & Voll 1996:23). Interestingly, 
this principle has been evolved further, by Islamic democrats, to represent equality 
within the political system because all humans are equal before God (Esposito & Voll 
1996:25). Khilafat has been reconceptualized in the same way by removing the 
emphasis from the historically monarchical leader to now make this concept one of 
representation (Esposito & Voll 1996:26). In addition, Islamic democracy may be 
seen as supporting the Islamic concepts of shura (consultation), ijma (consensus) and 
ijtihad (independent interpretive judgement) (Esposito & Voll 1996:27). This 
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redefinition has been vital in the argumentation of Islamists and Islamic revisionists 
who both support the building of an Islamic democracy. It is my impression that 
Esposito and Voll share this belief in an Islamic democracy based on Islamic culture, 
history and familiar Islamic institutions. Esposito and Voll do not stress the issue of 
religion any further than mentioning the non-existing tradition of any ‘church-body’. 
The ulama (learned scholars of faith), the different schools of Islamic law, and the 
mystic brotherhoods have all developed as autonomous bodies, separated from the 
state, and sometimes in conflict with the state (Esposito & Voll 1996:4). This 
clarification from Esposito and Voll could be interpreted as acceptance of the 
institutional division of religion and state. Their avoidance of secularist discussion 
may on the other hand indicate that they do not view the separation of religion and 
politics, as in discussions and underlying motives, as crucial for democracy. Without 
Esposito and Voll actually confirming this stand I would suggest that their view may 
be seen in line with Taylor’s overlapping consensus.  
 
Khurshid Ahmad is Professor at the Institute of Policy Studies in Islamabad, but he is 
also a Pakistani Islamist leader. He disputes the idea of a Western monolithic model 
for democracy. According to Ahmad, Western democracy is a contested phenomenon 
that accordingly is not realistic to export to the Muslim world and Third world 
countries in general (Ahmad 2000:2). Ahmad divides between what he sees as the 
two major dimensions of democracy; philosophical roots, and operational 
mechanisms. The philosophical roots comprise “the concept of popular sovereignty 
and consequent principle of legitimacy based exclusively on popular support” 
(Ahmad 2000:2). Ahmad sees this as a denial of the existence of eternal religious 
guidance (Ahmad 2000:3). According to Ahmad, an Islamic political system opposes 
the concept of the sovereignty of the people in that it contradicts their conviction of 
God as the ‘Supreme Law-Giver’ (Ahmad 2000:14). Ahmad strongly opposes 
secularism which he finds in conflict with Islam. The operational mechanisms of 
democracy on the other hand include “ensuring people’s participation in governance 
in order to discern the will of the people as to the choice of rulers as well of policies 
and programs” (Ahmad 2000:2). This dimension of democracy is in line with 
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Ahmad’s argumentation. He sees the principles of justice (‘adl) and consultation 
(shura), both deeply anchored in Islamic thought, as equal with the substance of the 
operational mechanisms (Ahmad 2000:2). Through the position of God’s vicegerent 
(khalifa), the people10 are trusted to run their worldly affairs as long as this is 
exercised in accordance with the Shari’a (Ahmad 2000:8). This may be compared to 
some of the thoughts of Hayek and the New Right that promote a ‘Legal Democracy’ 
model where legislation limits the scope of state action (Held 1996:258-259). Ahmad 
can be read as portraying a system where the Islamic law Shari’a is limiting or 
working as guidance for state policy. Ahmad is quite reluctant in giving Western 
democratic systems recognition, especially on behalf of the Islamic model. Still, 
Ahmad goes as far as giving the Western democracies credit for developing 
mechanisms as the multi-party system, various electoral systems, the separation of 
the judiciary and the executive institutions etc (Ahmad 2000:4). In highlighting 
various democratic mechanisms as useful, Ahmad finds himself in a position close to 
Weber and Schumpeter’s conception of formal democracy. It seems like Ahmad 
agrees with Huntington in that Western democracies will not work in Islamic 
societies. But Ahmad believes that there is a difference between Western democracy 
and democracy in general. He actually goes as far as arguing that many democratic 
principles may stem from Islamic societies. This view is obviously in contrast to 
Huntington’s argumentation.  
 
There can be no doubt that Huntington stirred up a lot of passion with his article The 
clash of Civilizations. To cover the whole debate has not been my intention. 
Nevertheless, I have tried to show some of the different approaches. There are voices 
that believe the Islamists are capable of establishing democracy. Many see the 
importance in that democracy in the Islamic world needs to be based on Islamic 
values and concepts. Others go as far as accusing the Western understanding of 
democracy as narrow and in need of influences from for instance the Islamic world. 
                                              
10 According to Ahmad this comprises all Muslim men and women. 
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In spite of the differences within this discussion, there seem to be a lot of faith in the 
compatibility of Islamism and democracy.   
3.4 Concluding remarks   
In the discussion in 3.1 I ended up with a dichotomy of democracy: formal 
democracy vs. substantive democracy based on democratic values. This was done for 
the purpose of simplifying the arguments because of the analysis to come. I intend by 
no means to justify this dichotomy as a general solution when dealing with 
democracy.  
Still, substantive democracy is not very clear. Which democratic values one applies 
as a basis for such a model will differ. As seen in 3.3 these values are a matter of 
interpretation. Ahmad rejects such a model because he believes it comprises the 
principles of absolute popular sovereignty and secularisation. Ahmad’s view on 
Islamism can not go along with such principles in that he holds God as the sole 
sovereign. Likewise, Hefner talks of the values of equality, freedom and tolerance 
that he views as important components of such a model. 
In general, I would consider the main democratic principles of popular sovereignty, 
freedom and equality to be comprised in such a model. The point her being that the 
emphasis on the different values would vary according to as Østerud says (1995:169) 
what one considers to bee a good society. 
To sum it up: this perspective conditions that one view democracy as a model for 
society where the population obtains influence, and decisions are based on 
democratic values. The various models will differ on emphasising these values, but 
popular sovereignty, freedom and equality would probably work as a common 
platform.     
Hence, democracy has been split into a dichotomy: 
 
Democracy 1: The system/ideology represents a formal democracy if it takes in use 
electoral, procedural and institutional mechanisms that are democratically agreed 
upon. 
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Democracy 2: The system/ideology represents a substantive democracy if it allows 
for real popular influence, based upon the principles of popular sovereignty, freedom 
and equality. 
 
The substantive democracy would not exclude the tools and mechanisms of 
Democracy 1. Instead, it comprises a more extensive model that takes into 
consideration the actual influence of the people.  
 
The situation is additionally complicated when the question of religion is added to the 
picture. Religion will have an effect on the dichotomy.  
For the Democracy 1 variable, the question of religion is not hindering a democratic 
system as long as the procedures and institutional mechanisms are being held 
according to the popular will. 
As for the substantive democracy, the question of religion needs to be linked to the 
principles in question. If for instance religious influence is adjusted to these 
principles this influence should not cause a problem for the democratic conduct. 
However, as seen during the discussion in 3.2 the principles of freedom and equality 
sometimes contradict each other. The influences of religion can be seen as a matter of 
defending people’s freedom. Simultaneously, this freedom to argue and mix religious 
views in politics can violate the principle of equality if this policy is being imposed 
on people with other or no religious preferences. Accordingly, one has to check how 
the religious influences in such a system relate to the democratic values.  
If religion restricts these principles it can not be accepted as an integrated part of such 
a democracy. 
In 3.3 I looked into the discussion on Islamism and democracy in general, referring to 
the views of some scholars on this field of study. Obviously I could have referred to 
many more, but due to the limited scope of this study I had to focus on a restricted 
number. When comparing the argumentation and stands of the scholars with my 
democracy dichotomy, I find that Huntington is rejecting the coexistence of Islam 
with both Democracy 1 and Democracy 2. Ahmad is dismissing the possibility of a 
functioning Democracy 2 within an Islamist system, but he is however willing to 
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embrace Democracy 1. Through a gradual shift of meaning or content of the 
traditional Islamic institutions, Esposito and Voll are certain of the possibility for the 
mixing of Islamism and Democracy 1. I find their stand on the mixing with 
Democracy 2 unclear. Hefner, however, is clear in his backing of a Democracy 2 
system within Islam. He argues for the importance of civil society that brings 
democratic civility. He views many independent Islamist groups as part of this civil 
society. Hopefully these contributions will help placing the views on democracy 
discussed during the analysis to come.  
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4. The Emergence of an Islamist Movement in Tunisia. 
“The history of the contemporary Islamic movement in independent Tunisia is 
basically that of the movement now known as En-Nahda” (Hamdi 1998:7). First 
founded in 1970 as al-Jamâ’a al-Islâmiyya (The Islamic Group) the same movement 
was renamed to Harakat al-Ittijâh al-Islâmî (The Islamic Trend Movement) in 1981. 
Finally, the name was changed to the current Harakat al-Nahda (The Renaissance 
Movement/En-Nahda) in 1988, removing religious connections from the name after 
press from the government. Despite a couple of resigns where new groups were 
founded, the main core of members has remained loyal to En-Nahda making it the 
main oppositional force in Tunisia (Hamdi 1998:7). 
In this chapter I will try to give a description of the emergence of En-Nahda. First I 
will focus on the Tunisian historical background, which is essential to the rise of the 
Islamist organisation. Then I will try to cover the actual evolvement of the 
organisation and comment on this with reference to explaining factors analysed in 
Chapter 2.   
4.1 Brief historical background 
The original inhabitants of Tunisia were Berbers. In the year of 670, Arabs from 
today’s Egypt sent out armies that penetrated the Maghreb (Borowiec 1998:12). The 
Arabs settled down and the original inhabitants were undergoing a process of 
Islamisation and Arabisation.  
In 1702 a rebellion by Hussein bin Ali against the Ottomans installed a dynasty of 
Beys11 who lasted until 1957 (Ayubi 1995:119, Borowiec 1998:14). The Bey ruled 
rather autonomously but some taxes were claimed from the Ottoman Sultan in Turkey 
(Murphy 1999:43).  
                                              
11 A sort of monarchy  
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During the 19th century the European struggle for influence in North Africa grew 
stronger (Borowiec 1998:15). As a result, in 1883 Tunisia officially became a French 
protectorate. The Beydom was reduced to a symbolic role (Murphy 1999:43). 
Nationalist forces grew stronger at the beginning of the 20th century, first with the 
Young Tunisians and then with the Destour and finally the Neo-Destour party. After 
World War II the French government relaxed political restrictions on Tunisia and the 
Neo-Destour party negotiated a gradual transfer of political power. As an alternative 
to civil war the new French proposals for internal autonomy were accepted in 1954 
and two years later Habib Bourguiba, a charismatic leader of the Neo-Destour, led a 
delegation to Paris to negotiate independence (Murphy 1999:49). Independence was 
recognised on March 20, 1956.  
4.2 The political situation in independent Tunisia, 1956-1970 
The Neo-Destour won the following election and Bourguiba was appointed Prime 
Minister in April the same year (Murphy 1999:49). 
The Constituent Assembly, where all members sympathised with the Neo-Destour, 
decided in July 1957 to abolish the system of Beys. Tunisia became a republic and 
Bourguiba was elected President for a five-year term (Borowiec 1998:25, Murphy 
1999:49). Two years later the new National Assembly changed the constitution 
making the Neo-Destour “solely responsible for rule and order in the country” 
(Murphy 1999:50). Tunisia was now a one-party state, though the party was not 
entirely monolithic. The Neo-Destour was facing the typical problems of nationalist 
movements in post-independent time. Bourguiba and his party had led a struggle for 
independence, but further ideological foundations were lacking (Murphy 1999:50).  
Seeing the importance of having the Tunisian General Workers’ Union (UGTT) on 
his side, President Bourguiba made the union-man Ben Salah minister in 1957. Ben 
Salah convinced the President of the benefits of putting Tunisia on a socialist path of 
development. As Secretary of State for Planning and Finances from 1961, Ben Salah 
was in charge of the socialist project with wide authority (Hamdi 1998:7-8).  
Agricultural collectivisation became the flagship and farmers had to give up their 
land and go to work for the co-operatives (Hamdi 1998:9, Murphy 1999:55). 
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Corruption and inefficiency became a huge problem in the co-operatives, and public 
outcries increased. Bourguiba saw that the socialist experiment was threatening not 
only the country’s stability and prosperity, but also his own position as leader (Hamdi 
1998:9-10). Other party-members grew jealous of Ben Salah’s increasing influence 
(Murphy 1999:55) and in 1969 Bourguiba dismissed and later arrested the Secretary 
of State for Planning and Finances, turning Ben Salah into a scapegoat for the 
government’s failed economic policies.  
From the very beginning, Bourguiba led a policy of modernisation, decidedly pro-
Western and secular (Esposito 1999:161). The religious reforms were radically 
affecting law, family life, education and personal religious practice (Hamdi 1998:13). 
Polygamy was banned, the Shari’a courts were abolished, the hijab (women’s 
headscarf) were banned in some settings, Bourguiba encouraged the workers to break 
the fast of Ramadan and the Islamic university of Zeitouna was closed down 
(Esposito 1999:161, Hamdi 1998:13). 
The reforms brought the structures of national religious life under government 
control. A powerless mufti was appointed and the ulama (religious scholars) were 
politically neutralised (Boulby 1988:591, Hamdi 1998:14). “For Bourguiba, Islam 
represented the past; the West was Tunisia’s only hope for a modern future” 
(Esposito 1999:161). 
A new educational system similar to the French was developed and all higher 
education was taught in French.    
This educational system made people with Arab-Islamic upbringing feel alienated in 
their own country. For advanced studies taught in Arabic, they had to leave for 
countries in the Middle East.  
People were getting frustrated by high unemployment rates and shortage of food 
during the tine after the collectivist project (Esposito 1999:162). The failure of Ben 
Salah’s socialist program gave the impression that Bourguiba and his party was 
unable to offer a successful ideological framework for a workable model of 
development (Shahin 1997: 65). 
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Disappointment following the Arab defeat in the 6-days war in 1967, made people’s 
faith in Arab nationalism decrease. This was the situation when the founding 
members of the Islamic group met in 1970. 
4.3 The founding period, 1970-1979. 
From the mid-60s the Zeitouna Mosque served as a gathering place for traditional 
scholars avoiding Bourguiba’s secularisation policies (Shahin 1997:67). Some of 
these scholars held discussion circles and this was how the founding figures Rachid 
Ghannouchi, Abdelfattha Mourou and Ahmida Enneifer met (Hamdi 1998:16). 
According to Ghannouchi, they acted as a religious and cultural response to 
Bourguiba’s anti-religious and pro-Western policies (Hamdi 1998:12). The political, 
social, economic and cultural backwardness of a Tunisian society, heavily influenced 
by the West, as well as its loss of identity and morals, called for a return to Islam 
(Esposito 1999:163).  
The founding group had two levels of activity. They promoted conferences and 
gatherings in secondary schools and they organised lessons on Islam in the mosques. 
They were influenced by Jamâ’at al-Tablîgh, an Indian religious group, and used their 
method of missionary. At this time the movement was mainly concerned with 
religious issues; the basics of Islam, but also Islamic history and identity (Hamdi 
1998:19-20). They joined the government-supported Association for the 
Safeguarding of the Holy Quran, which served as a cover for their organisation, but 
also contributed to spreading their thoughts (Hamdi 1998:19, Shahin 1997:72, 
Tamimi 2001:31). The Islamic Group’s leaders started to publish the review al-
Ma’rifa12 (Knowledge) in 1972 (Shahin 1997:77). In 1973 the group was expelled 
from the Association for the Safeguarding of the Holy Quran, when the authorities 
had registered their high activities (Shahin 1997:72).  
The group grew stronger during the seventies. Dreams of employment and prosperity 
among youth and villagers migrating to the cities seldom came true (Hamdi 1998:11). 
Tunisia, at this time, had a total unemployment rate of 25%. 60% of the Tunisian 
                                              
12 Ma’rifa was published between 1972 and 1979. 
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population were under the age of 20 and they constituted the majority of those 
unemployed (Shahin 1997:75). Accordingly the Islamists had their major support 
among the disappointed youth. 
The University became central in recruiting members, and a battlefield between the 
Marxists and the Islamists opened up on campus. As a result of these battles, the 
students sympathising with the Islamists found it necessary to address new social and 
political issues, to have an alternative answer to the Marxist agenda. In the end this 
led to a politicisation of the Islamic Group as a whole (Hamdi 1998:25-28).  
The General strike in January 1978 further politicised the Islamists. The workers’ 
union (UGTT) demonstrated together with the students against the government’s 
policy of market economy, which they claimed made the workers and middle class 
poorer. The Islamists saw the need for social justice and the rights of workers and 
started to talk about an Islamic theory of development. The government, who used 
the military to quell the demonstrations, lost a large part of its support base among the 
workers to the Islamists the following period (Hamdi 1998:31-32).  
Another incident that affected the Islamists support was the Iranian revolution. The 
Islamist movement in Tunisia was genuinely supportive of the revolution in Iran and 
spread their enthusiasm for it in several published articles in Al-Mujtama13 (Hamdi 
1998:33). Their support resulted in some clashes with the government, mainly oral 
disputes (Shahin 1997:83-84). At the same time the reference to a concrete example 
(Iran) where Islamism was put into practise made the whole movement optimistic, 
and the number of followers increased (Hamdi 1998:34).   
4.4 Explaining the renaissance.  
When comparing the emergence of MTI (later En-Nahda) with the explanatory 
factors discussed in chapter 2, there are several similarities between those general 
assumptions and the specific Tunisian situation. Guazzone’s first factor, discussed 
under 2.1, is “the cultural contradiction produced by the kind of access to modernity 
to the Arab world”. These problems with modernity are quite evident in the Tunisian 
                                              
13 The Islamic movement’s weekly newspaper, published from 1978-1980. 
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case. President Bourguiba had a strong wish to modernise (Esposito 1999:161). He 
softened the religious impact, believing the road to modernisation went through 
secularism. As Ghannouchi said (Hamdi 1998:12), they were acting as a response to 
the anti-religious and pro-Western policies of Bourguiba. Additionally, the influence 
of the Western values in general and the decision to use French language at the 
Universities in particular, contributed to alienate parts of the Tunisian population. 
This continuous removal from Arab and Muslim culture and identity would explain 
why many turned to the Islamists.  
As for the discussion referred to under 2.1.1, whether this Islamic reaction is mainly 
caused by marginalisation of religion as Roy and Kepel argues, or if it is a fight over 
symbols representing familiar values and cultural heritage, is hard to say. There was a 
strong marginalisation of religion in Tunisia, and I believe The Islamic Group first 
reacted to this. But this reaction does not exclude the fact that identity issues, as this 
fight over symbols represents, became important during the evolvement of the 
movement. I personally believe that both explanations are likely to have an impact. 
Guazzone’s second explanatory factor was “the crisis of efficiency and legitimacy of 
the political ideologies and systems established after independence” (Guazzone 
1995:4)(evt 2.1). Since Bourguiba was a popular leading independence-figure there 
was little opposition when he seized power in 1956. But like Nasser in Egypt and 
other post-independence leaders, Bourguiba typically did not have strong preferences 
in politics. He tried different types of policies. When for instance the socialist 
experiment failed Bourguiba tried an ‘open door’-policy with economic liberalisation. 
These shifts in policy showed that Bourguiba lacked ideological roots in politics, 
which clearly gave the President a legitimacy problem. Additionally, when the 
shifting policies did not work, and poverty and unemployment rates were 
continuously rising, the confidence in the government was in decline as the crisis of 
efficiency spread. With unemployment rates as high as 25% of the population, and 
these being mostly youth under the age of 20 (Shahin 1997:75), the Islamists had a 
huge potential. As seen, the Islamists grasped the opportunity. They entered the 
Universities where ‘soon to be unemployed’ students listened and joined in. 
Moreover, the Islamists got involved with the workers’ union (UGTT) which 
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originally supported the President. During the demonstrations of 1978 the Islamists 
were defending the workers’ rights, propagating for an Islamic policy of 
development. The government used the military to stop the demonstrations, and lost 
many supporters to the Islamists in the following period.                        
4.5 Turning political, 1979- 
In 1979 the movement’s support was wider than anyone had expected. The 
movement’s journal al-Ma’rifa had increased from 6000 reviews in 1971 to 25000 
reviews in 1979 (Boulby 1988:600). The leaders felt they had to reconsider their 
activity and called for a conference to discuss and decide on the movement’s future 
(Hamdi 1998:34). 70 of the most prominent members attended and agreed upon a 
constitution for their secret association in August. Ghannouchi was elected president 
(Amir) and a detailed structure for the whole organisation was worked out. 
Two incidents in the end of 1980 and the beginning of 1981 affected the policy of the 
secret association. In December 1980 two members were arrested. The association 
calculated that these members were tortured and that they would give away 
information to the police (Hamdi 1998:37). It was only a matter of time before the 
government and the police would know about the association and take action.  
The other incident was the shift in government policy. The new Prime Minister Mzali 
was a political liberal. Mzali made Bourguiba open up for political pluralism in April 
1981 (Murphy 1999:63). These events made the association move toward openness. 
It applied for official recognition as a political party in June 1981 with great 
expectations (Hamdi 1998:37-38).     
The political openness did not last long. Already in the autumn of 1981 61 leaders of 
the MTI were arrested (Shahin 1997:87, Boulby 1988:609). MTI was not recognised 
as a political party; instead other opposition parties were tolerated. Still, these parties 
had to wait until 1983/1984 to be fully recognised, and then only after huge pressure 
from all oppositional groups (Murphy 1999:64). 
The bad economic situation in Tunisia with heavy loans to the World Bank affected 
the whole country in this period. The World Bank demanded in 1983 Tunisia to cut 
state subsidies to obtain new loans. The government cut subsidies on wheat with the 
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result that prices on bread and pasta-products more than doubled (Tjomsland 
2000:89). This led to ‘bread-riots’ in January 1984 in cities all over Tunisia (Hamdi 
1998:47). The bread-riots cannot be seen as an Islamist initiative, but rather a popular 
response to the socio-economic situation (Krämer 1994:201). Nevertheless, the 
Islamists managed to turn this situation to their advantage; Islamist rhetoric was used 
in the demonstrations and the Islamist support were massive. 
To calm the situation Prime Minister Mzali managed to convince the President to free 
most of the Islamists arrested in 1981 (Tjomsland 2000:89).          
Political liberalisation was to some point achieved by extending the freedom of 
expression and association; human rights groups were registered and political parties 
legalised (Krämer 1994:201). The MTI and the Islamist journalists remained illegal, 
but they were given more space (Tjomsland 2000:89).  
A. Hermassi suggests that the relaxed policy towards the Islamists was a tactical 
manoeuvre from the government (Hermassi 1995:107-108). In the period from 1984 
to 1986 the Islamists were relatively free to do as they pleased. Prime Minister Mzali 
even arranged for meetings with MTI leaders (Boulby 1988:610). Mzali’s idea was to 
neutralise the Islamists while undermining the UGTT (Hermassi 1995:107). The 
UGTT was clearly weakened, but the Islamists were far from neutralised.  
The aging and increasingly senile President Bourguiba did not trust the MTI which 
by now was clearly the strongest oppositional force. Prime Minister Mzali was fired 
in 1986 and the Islamists were again put under heavy repression (Boulby 1988:610). 
In March 1987 the repression culminated in a major crack-down on MTI where 
hundreds were arrested the following months (Tjomsland 2000:93). The MTI was 
accused of taking violent action to obtain their goals. There had been some violent 
clashes and terror attacks on tourist hotels in Bourguiba’s hometown Monastir. The 
possible connection between the MTI and the attackers was widely debated. The 
government and scholars as A. Hermassi14 considered all Islamists to be the same. 
They accused them all for standing behind MTI with a wish to violently overthrow 
the Tunisian government. 
                                              
14 A. Hermassi later became a Minister in Ben Ali’s government and his objectivity is therefore questionable.  
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Other oppositional groups, different scholars, and MTI themselves have pointed out 
that the MTI leadership has continuously stressed the importance of achieving change 
through democratic measures. When there has been disagreement on this issue, 
members with anti-democratic attitudes have been asked to leave the organisation.  
During the Monastir bombing-trial several of the accused affirmed in court that they 
were not members of the MTI. The factual basis of the accusations was extremely 
dubious (Boulby 1988:611). The arrested MTI Islamists were accused of planning 
bombings as well as conspiring to overthrow the regime. Bourguiba asked for all of 
the imprisoned Islamists, that they would be sentenced to death. Executing the 
leading members of such a strong group, as the MTI now represented, would most 
likely turn those executed into martyrs and lead to a continuation of violent acts. 
Leaders of other oppositional parties defended the MTI and even other groups in the 
Arab world and European politicians got involved (Boulby 1988:612). 
4.6 An opening? 
When Prime Minister Ben Ali set forth a bloodless coup d’etat on November 7th 
1987, most people were just relieved (Boulby 1988:613). He pointed out that 
Bourguiba had failed to implement democracy, promising that as the new ruler he 
would democratise Tunisia. Ben Ali also accused his predecessor of disregarding the 
Arab and Islamic identity of Tunisia, which would now be restored under the new 
regime (Hamdi 1998:64). 
Ben Ali announced a wish for political reconciliation and illustrated this by releasing 
nearly all Islamist prisoners connected to MTI (Tjomsland 2000:95). This was 
followed by a mutual acceptance between the MTI and Ben Ali. They cooperated 
with the Pacte Nationale, an expression of political consensus among all political 
groups aimed at getting Tunisia back on track (Hermassi 1995:109, Tjomsland 
2000:95).  
The MTI was represented in the High Islamic Council, a government-appointed body 
that dealt with all religious matters in a consultative manner. The Islamic student 
organisation was legalised, but an official recognition of the MTI was still put on 
hold (Hermassi 1995:110).  
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The Islamists tried hard to win the confidence of the authorities. They changed their 
name from MTI to En-Nahda (The Renaissance movement) to fulfil the government’s 
requirements that no political party could be based on religious or ethnic values 
(Hamdi 1998:64, Hermassi 1995:111).       
Nevertheless, En-Nahda was forbidden to participate as a party in the 1989 elections. 
Instead they participated with independent Islamist candidates (Shahin 1997:100) 
covering 20 of a total of 25 constituencies (La Presse 1989b).  
According to the official results, given to La Presse, the government party RCD 
obtained 80,34% of the votes, the independent candidates got 14,54% of the votes 
and the rest of the official parties got approximately 5% support altogether (La Presse 
1989a). En-Nahda’s support in the major cities, including Tunis, was around 40% of 
the votes (Shahin 1997:101).   
Regardless of whether the election results were accurate or not, they strongly 
indicated that the Islamists had become an established oppositional force, making En-
Nahda a threat to the regime. 
Ben Ali soon took the consequences of the election results. The reports from the 
municipal elections in neighboring Algeria where The Islamic FIS had won most of 
the districts, proved to President Ben Ali that the Islamist threat should not be 
overlooked (Shahin 1997:101). 
4.7 Fading out?  
Already in May 1989 Rachid Ghannouchi, the leader of En-Nahda, left Tunisia to 
live in exile. Shortly after, the movement’s review now named Al-Fajr, was closed 
down. The Islamic student organisation was banned, and religious lessons at the 
Zeituna University were prohibited. Further measures such as closing mosques 
immediately after each prayer, and the installing of government appointed imams 
were put forth (Shahin 1997:101). Arrests and harassment of En-Nahda-members, 
their families and also sympathisers of the organisation were part of a government-
policy of eliminating the movement. 
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The regime justified their continuous repression of En-Nahda by two incidents in the 
spring of 1991. There was a violent attack on the government party’s office in Bab 
Souika, central Tunis, by three young Islamists. This attack was covered heavily in 
the official media. Additionally, the Interior Ministry announced that a ‘plot’ by En-
Nahda to seize power had been discovered and diverged. According to the Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights, both of the trials following the incidents were 
characterised by irregularities and lack of evidence (Shahin 1997:102). Dunn on the 
other hand argues that there would be no smoke without fire, and he trusts most of the 
government’s accusations (Dunn 1996:160-162). At this time there was a split in the 
organisation and Mourou, the most prominent leader next to Ghannouchi, stepped 
down. Shahin and Dunn hold this split to be caused by the violent incident in Bab 
Souika, which Mourou did not approve of. In fact, it is hard to know if anyone in the 
leadership approved of this violence in that a clandestine wing probably conducted 
the attack (Dunn 1996:160). Additionally, there was a conflict of opinion between 
Ghannouchi and Mourou as a result of the Gulf war (Roy 1994:121). Ghannouchi 
condemned Saudi Arabia for letting US soldiers operate from Muslim land, while 
Mourou with close ties to the Saudis were reluctant to criticise his friends (Dunn 
1996:159, Roy 1994:121). The Saudis constituted a major economic contributor; 
funding En-Nahda along with many other Islamist groups. Accordingly, En-Nahda 
lost this help as a consequence of Ghannouchi’s critique.  
Nevertheless, by 1992 Amnesty International reported that at least 8000 followers of 
En-Nahda were imprisoned in Tunisia (Shahin 1997:101).  
3000 of these were later convicted of being members of an unauthorised association 
(Shahin 1997:101). Additionally, the Tunisian League for Human Rights was 
suppressed from 1992 and onwards. The government was now clearly intolerant of 
any public dissent (Shahin 1997:103). The announced electoral reform of 1994 (Dunn 
1996:162) did not change much of this picture. Even tough 19 seats in parliament 
were now reserved for the legal oppositional parties, the opposition was unable to 
capture any additional seats (Shahin 1997:103). Moreover, it seems like Ben Ali 
strengthened his position as an autocratic President when arresting the former head of 
the Tunisian League for Human Rights, Muncif al-Marzuqi, when trying to challenge 
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Ben Ali for President (Shahin 1997:103). When eliminated his opponent, Ben Ali 
won the usual 99.91% of the votes in the elections of 1994.  
The situation has ever since the beginning of the 1990s made it impossible for En-
Nahda to act openly in Tunisia. En-Nahda has continued its work by holding 
conferences abroad. In 1995 they restructured the organisation and redefined its 
policy towards the Tunisian regime. Most importantly, they stressed their non-violent 
nature, and decided working for the prevention of further political polarisation in 
society by fighting for the political rights of the entire Tunisian society. Rachid 
Ghannouchi living in exile in London, was re-elected leader (Amir) of En-Nahda at 
this conference with only 52% of the votes (Tamimi 2001:72). He has established an 
En-Nahda office in London, and he is constantly travelling, giving lectures and 
interviews about the En-Nahda policy. He is in contact with other Islamist groups on 
a regular basis, but argues for variations in Islamist policy in that different countries 
require solutions adjusted to their specific context (Interview with the author, June 
2003).        
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5. En-Nahda’s Islamic Democracy 
One of the main critics of En-Nahda, and their claim of supporting a democratic 
system, is not surprisingly the Tunisian regime. The movement is classified as illegal 
by the Tunisian government. 
Michael Collins Dunn has been the strongest criticiser among the Western scholars in 
that he believes in the government accusations that En-Nahda was planning a plot in 
1991 (Dunn 1996:160-162, Tamimi 2001:201). In addition, Bahey Eddin Hassan, 
director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, has accused Ghannouchi for 
hypocrisy. He believes Ghannouchi is occupied with fighting violence and promoting 
Human Rights only in Tunisia, while remaining quiet about these conditions in 
Algeria, Iran and Sudan (Tamimi 2001:204). Arab secularist Haydar Ibrahim Ali 
holds En-Nahda and it’s leader as pragmatists. He claims that they do not believe in 
what they profess (Tamimi 2001:207). Likewise, Abdelqader Zghad accuses En-
Nahda for supporting democracy not as a value, but as less costly means than armed 
forces to achieve political power (Tamimi 2001:207-208). Mohammed Hamdi, a 
former member of En-Nahda, has analysed several aspects of the organisation. In 
resent years he has dissociated himself from the movement and its ideology. 
However, I will apply his views in this thesis due to his detailed knowledge of the 
En-Nahda argumentation.      
I believe much of the criticism is difficult to verify in that many of the questions 
comprise a hypothetic scenario where En-Nahda seize power through legal elections. 
Still, I will comment on some of the accusations in the conclusion.      
 
When explaining and analyzing someone else’s ideology it is important to have a 
conscious relation to the information one uses. Access to primary sources such as 
documents and interviews give valuable information. On the other hand the 
information given by primary sources are more interesting when complemented with 
other sources, such as scholars on the subject.  
In the following I will take a brief look at the Political Manifest of the En-Nahda. 
However, to completely understand the En-Nahda ideology I need to examine 
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interviews, books and articles on the subject. When trying to look at the different 
contributions I focus on the concept of Islamic democracy in 5.1.  
In 5.2 the question of religion has been made a distinct paragraph.  
Finally, in 5.3, I will try to categorise the Islamic democracy of En-Nahda according 
to my dichotomy and in comparison with the contributions discussed in 3.3.   
 
5.1 En-Nahda’s Ideology 
Since my focus in this dissertation is on democracy I am not going to explore every 
aspect of the En-Nahda ideology. The illegal political party of En-Nahda have 
pledged their support to democracy on several occasions (Boulby 1998:604, Burgat & 
Dowell 1993:195). In my interview with En-Nahda leader Mr. Rachid Ghannouchi he 
confirms this stand: “Currently we are working for the establishment of democracy in 
Tunisia” (Interview with the author: June 2003).  Hence, the primal concern will be 
on En-Nahda’s democratic reasoning.  
In 2.2.2, I portrayed Islamist movements with an evolutionist approach as more likely 
to support a democratic system than conservative literalist groups. Evolutionist 
movements are more eager to change the system according to modern or 
contemporary needs. Still, this does not mean that these automatically support 
democracy. I expect En-Nahda to support the evolutionist approach. Accordingly, I 
will comment upon this in the following analysis.  
The other main factor deciding the Islamist direction is their stand on political action. 
A revolutionary approach is less likely to be compatible with democratic behaviour. 
Reformist movements who want to change the system from within are definitely 
more in line with democratic principles. They show interest in the popular will. In 
chapter 4 I have shown En-Nahda’s general willingness to be part of the political 
system. There are some uncertainty about their conduct in 1991, when a violent 
incident occurred, and the government accused the movement for planning a coup 
d’etat. The En-Nahda policy previous to and after 1991 has however been a non-
violent one.     
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As pointed out during chapter 3, democracy is not an easy concept with one 
prevailing understanding that everyone supports. To make this analysis more easy to 
grasp, I concluded my discussion on democracy under 3.1 with a simplified 
dichotomy. This dual way of understanding the concept of democracy is by no means 
complete and superior to other ways of treating this field of study. Still, I felt the need 
to restrict the theoretical universe for the sake of conducting a more useful analysis. 
Hence, in the analysis to come I will use the two concepts of democracy that I ended 
up with as a result of my theoretical discussion. Moreover, I will compare the En-
Nahda ideology on democracy with the formal- and substantive democracy 
perspectives.    
5.1.1 Political manifest 
The Tunisian Islamist movement was officially constituted as a political party in 1981 
when it launched the first political manifest. It applied for official recognition as a 
political party in June 1981 as the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI). In the 
following years MTI experienced a lot of obstacles in becoming a legal political 
party. As a consequence they changed their name to En-Nahda/the Renaissance 
movement in 1988, in accordance with the new law on political parties of May 3 
1988. A new En-Nahda party constitution was simultaneously proclaimed. Due to the 
evolving during the 1980s of En-Nahda’s ideology, especially in relation to 
democracy, I find the 1988 Constitution more relevant than the previous version. 
I am therefore going to use the En-Nahda Constitution from 1988 as my main source 
when referring to their political manifest.  
In the 1988 Constitution the proclamation of the political party is formulated in 
article 1. Article 2 enhances the goals of the Renaissance Party divided into A: the 
political level, B: the economic level, and C: the social level. Below I will mainly 
discuss the goals on the political level. 
Article 2 states: 
1. “To strengthen the republican regime and its foundations and protect the civil 
society and implement the principle of popular sovereignty and application of 
the principle of “Shura”.”(The En-Nahda Constitution, 1988). 
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Evidently En-Nahda supports a republican regime in contrast to the regimes of Beys15 
that previously dominated Tunisia. What they mean by “its foundations” is hard to 
say though. Further they want to protect civil society. It is quite obvious that En-
Nahda regards the temporary regime in Tunisia as in lack of support for civil society, 
and sometimes even repressive towards elements within civil society. En-Nahda is 
among those groups that have felt this repression from the regime. In addition, civil 
society is by many theorists within the field of democratisation held as an important 
and also indispensable element of the democratisation process (see for instance 
Hefner 3.3). This due to the democratic learning one predicts organisational- life and 
interaction give. Pluralists would support this view together with the New Left. 
In my view this goal is especially interesting because of the focus on popular 
sovereignty and the use of the Arabic term ‘Shura’. The principle of popular 
sovereignty is closely connected to democratic thought. Most democracy theorists 
hold this principle as central and vital in their argumentation. Popular sovereignty is 
by these considered as the foundation of democracy. Interesting in this connection is 
the question of religion. As seen by for instance Kurshid Ahmad, many Islamists 
have trouble accepting the sovereignty of any other than God. Obviously Islamists 
see this differently. En-Nahda have chosen to include this principle already in the first 
political goal in their constitution. I believe this inclusion is a contributory proof that 
En-Nahda supports an evolutionist view within Islamism (according to 2.2.2).    
In addition, the principle of ‘Shura’ is pointed out as important. Shura is normally 
translated to mean consultation. It is a principle formulated in the Shari’a. 
Traditionally this concept has been understood as an advise or request for the leader 
to consult advisors in political matters of significance. More recently the term has 
been interpreted as an obligation for the leader to consult in political matters. And 
instead of advisors the leader should consult with the people. This is why many 
Islamists and others claim that the political leadership needs an approval through 
elections to be legitimate. This presentation of shura is in many ways parallel to 
democracy as in the formal understanding of the concept. 
                                              
15 The Bey could be considered a monarch 
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It should be stressed that En-Nahda is not using the term democracy themselves. 
Whether this is due to their disregard of the democratic concept or is linked to other 
causes such as the Western connection is hard to say.   
2. “To achieve freedom as a basic principle commemorating the dignity given to 
mankind by their creator, by supporting public and individual freedoms, human 
rights, an independent justice system, and a free administration.” (The En-
Nahda Constitution, 1988). 
This goal indicates a strong emphasis on the relation between God and man. At the 
same time it is a statement that mankind is given the freedom of choice. En-Nahda 
interprets the Islamic religion to mean that some things are in the hands of humans. 
God trusts humans to make their own choices on certain issues. This is a typical 
evolutionist view within the characterisation of Islamists seen in chapter 2. The goal 
indicates that En-Nahda supports human-made laws and interpretations.  
Interestingly, En-Nahda stresses the principles of public and individual freedoms. The 
focus on public freedoms is in line with many traditional Muslim societies, while 
individual freedom is typically understood as Western oriented. As seen earlier in 
chapter 3, individual freedom was an important part of the evolvement of the liberal 
view, and later liberal democracy. I think this goal bear witness to an attempt to 
combine traditional views with more modern or Western ways of thinking.  
Further, by stressing the support of “human rights, an independent justice system, and 
a free administration” En-Nahda strengthens its position as a movement in favour of 
democracy.  
The rest of the goals on A. the political level, enhance foreign policy and regional co-
operation:   
3. “To implement a foreign policy based on the sovereignty of the country, its 
unity and independence, and to build international relations on mutual respect 
and interest, and the principles of sovereignty, justice, and equality.”  
4. “To support co-operation and harmony between Arab and Islamic countries and 
to work toward more compassion and unity among them.”  
5. “ To propagate the spirit of Arabic and Islamic unity and to bring attention to the 
fundamental issues facing us in order to put an end to the divisions, hatred, and 
bitter fighting and to build a more prosperous future while putting a greater 
emphasis on the unity of the Maghreb countries.” 
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6. “ To support the struggle for the liberation of Palestine, and to put it as a central 
issue necessitating a firm stand against Zionist occupation which has placed in 
the Arab heartland a foreign entity thus preventing progress and unity.” 
7. “ To support the cause of freedom in the Arab, Islamic, and entire world, and to 
denounce colonialism and racism in Afghanistan, Eritrea, South Africa, and 
elsewhere, as well as to support all the popular movement for freedoms and 
justice.” 
8. “ To increase the level of co-operation between African countries, to consider it 
a strategic choice for our country, to build stronger ties between the 
Mediterranean nations by eliminating all causes of tension, and to contribute to 
better relations between all peoples based on peace and justice.”(The En-Nahda 
Constitution, 1988)  
Without commenting every goal, the very essence of these goals conveys with what 
could be called typical Islamist. The strengthening of Arab and Islamic unity together 
with increased regional co-operation, with both Mediterranean and African countries, 
witness a conscious policy. The consequences I read from these manifestations are 
increased independence from the West. En-Nahda is indirectly trying to distance 
themselves from Western dependency. As to the democratic discussion I find this 
Islamist policy of independence from the West irrelevant.   
A last interesting goal is to be found under C: on the social level. 
13. “ To support all popular organisations by protecting their survival, unity, 
democratic means within them, and independence so that they can truly 
represent the interests of their members and of society as a whole, and protect 
them from any kind of oppression.”(The En-Nahda Constitution, 1988).   
This can be read as a proof of En-Nahda’s emphasis on the importance of a strong 
civil society. As mentioned earlier, civil society is often connected or made a 
prerequisite for the developing of democracy. I will cover Ghannouchi’s views on 
civil society more thoroughly in 5.3.  
In that the emphasis in article 13 is on all popular organisations indicates that En-
Nahda is following up their devotion to civil society and the principles of freedom 
articulated in article 1 and 2. This can be held as an argument of their consistency. It 
can also be read as a argument in support of a substantive democracy. The term 
democratic is used in article 13 when promising to protect organisations “with 
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democratic means within them”. This can only be interpreted as support for 
democracy. 
5.1.2 Ghannouchi’s thoughts on Islamic democracy 
In the early days of En-Nahda, more precisely in the 1970s, democracy or Islamic 
democracy was never an issue. En-Nahda-leader Ghannouchi and his colleagues 
rather emphasised the question of education and morality (Hamdi 1998:102). They 
wanted an educational system that was Arab, instead of French, and they wanted 
more emphasis on religion in this education. This was En-Nahda’s reaction to the 
modernisation program of Bourguiba, which was mainly based on a French model. 
The other interest, morality, was more of a personal issue than a political one. They 
wanted people to go into themselves and follow the religious message. The society as 
a whole would be better off if everyone was more concerned with religion. 
It was only after the politicisation of the movement in the late 1970s, as a result of the 
trade union’s demonstrations, that issues of democracy and political freedom were 
raised (Hamdi 1998:102). Hamdi believes that in the beginning this concern was for 
pure pragmatic reasons because the democratic claim made it harder for the 
government to ban the organisation. 
Ghannouchi describes this shift as a necessary step for the movement to “link with 
the realities of the Maghreb” (Interview with al-Shira, 1994:3). These circumstances 
compelled En-Nahda to emphasize two axes: the axis of identity and the axis of civil 
liberties. They wanted to defend Islam as an identity, not merely as a state or way of 
life (Interview with al-Shira 1994:3). Further, Ghannouchi holds that centralisation of 
the state had made it impossible to find independent organisations in Tunisia. In order 
to fight for the principle of civil liberties the Islamist movement found it necessary to 
co-operate with other oppositional forces within Tunisia (Interview with al-Shira 
1994:3). 
The years between 1981 and 1984 that Ghannouchi spent in prison marked a shift in 
his interest (Hamdi 1998:103). During these years Ghannouchi wrote the book “al-
Hurriyyat al-‘amma” where he presented his Islamic democracy (Hamdi 1998:102).  
Following this period, there is no doubt that Ghannouchi becomes the head 
philosopher of En-Nahda. He is the one who puts the organisation’s ideas into a 
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system, and evolves them far beyond En-Nahda’s original plan. Deriving from this, it 
may be hard to separate the En-Nahda philosophy from Ghannouchi’s own opinion. 
Nevertheless, Ghannouchi was elected president of En-Nahda, again, after writing 
several of his books, and this serves as an indicator of the general En-Nahda support 
of Ghannouchi’s philosophy.   
 
The relationship to Western democracy  
First of all, Ghannouchi states the possibility that democracy may have Islamic roots 
(Hamdi 1998:104, Tamimi 2001:80). Europeans benefited from the Islamic 
civilisation’s heritage of engineering and mathematics, and made concrete technology 
out of it. To Ghannouchi and other Islamic thinkers it seems perfectly reasonable that 
Europeans may have ‘borrowed’ other ideas as well (Krämer 1993:3). However, in 
contrast to many Islamic thinkers he sees no reason for Muslims to reject the Western 
tools of democracy. The concepts of ijma (consensus) and shura (consultation) are 
strongly rooted in Islam. Ghannouchi finds Western-made tools of democracy 
compatible with these Islamic principles. 
Despite his acceptance of democratic tools, Ghannouchi strongly criticises parts of 
Western democracy. First he points out the historical problems of general suffrage. In 
the beginning there was only men with property that could vote and women’s 
suffrage was only accomplished in the first half or the middle of the 20th century 
(Tamimi 2001:86). He further criticises the Western democracy of today as ”a multi-
party system of governance exercised by an elite of political leaders” (Tamimi 
2001:86). It is tempting to interpret Ghannouchi’s argumentation as a criticism of the 
procedural and formal democracy-perspective. If he resents a system where political 
power is fought over within an elite of political leaders Ghannouchi is approaching a 
substantive argumentation. This stand opens for better accountability from 
politicians, and more participation of the people in political conduct.       
Nevertheless, Ghannouchi’s main criticism of Western democracy is the way liberal 
democracy remains restricted to national borders. The privileges of liberties and 
rights include only the citizens of the nation-state. According to Ghannouchi, this is 
why great democracies such as England and France also have been the cruellest 
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countries when dealing with other countries. Ghannouchi blames the horror of the 
colonisation on these Western democracies (Tamimi 2001:86-87). 
Still, Ghannouchi embraces the instruments of democracy like elections and the 
parliamentary system (Interview with Thomassen 1998:2). At the same time he 
criticises the philosophies of Western liberal democracies. It is especially the secular 
and nationalistic values he rejects (Interview with Thomassen 1998:2). He admits that 
Muslims need to learn from the West, which after centuries of struggle has found the 
spirit of dialogue. Muslims need to learn how to build a democratic pluralistic 
system, but as Muslims, he adds (Interview with Thomassen 1998:2). He says that 
democracy is a part of Islam and he holds rationalism, humanism, the possibility of 
interpretation (ijtihad), and diversity within Islam as proofs (Interview with 
Thomassen 1998:2). For a democratic regime to succeed it would need to be founded 
on sound philosophies and humanistic values. To Ghannouchi such philosophy can 
only be found in Islam (Tamimi 2001:89). If one moves away from the understanding 
that democracy is a strictly Western concept, the argumentation of Ghannouchi opens 
for an Islamic democracy as a substantive model (democracy 2). The question that 
follows is: will the Islamic democracy protect those values (mainly popular 
sovereignty, freedom and equality) that such an extensive model requires?             
 
The concept of Islamic democracy 
I find it best to quote Mr. Ghannouchi to understand why he is able to talk about 
Islamic democracy while many other Islamist groups reject the democratic idea: 
“Democracy is an object, not an ideology or philosophy. If you say ‘liberal democracy’ it can 
be an ideology, but democracy itself is a neutral conception which depends on how you 
define it. So we can mention the possibility of an Islamic democracy.”(Interview with 
Turkish Daily News 1996:2) 
Ghannouchi admits “Western communities learnt to solve its differences through 
political means instead of war after bloody conflicts as long as centuries” (Interview 
with Turkish Daily News 1996). The En-Nahda leader does not see why Muslims 
should not benefit from this experience. He points out that the Muslim societies of 
today obviously do not have a better system to offer. Accordingly, he is in favour of 
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accepting democracy as the best alternative we know of today, even if it may be 
Western in origin (Interview with Turkish Daily News 1996). 
In this argumentation Ghannouchi portrays democracy as a neutral concept. 
Democracy is a tool to use in politics to avoid bloody conflicts. This is very much in 
line with the formal understanding of the concept. 
He further holds that “Islam does not include a political system” (Interview with 
Turkish Daily News 1996). Ghannouchi believes there are political guidelines and 
values found in Islam, but there is no detailed political system to follow. In En-Nahda 
Islamists’ opinion God left the forming of a political system to the people. However, 
they do not separate religion completely from politics. As Ghannouchi said: “politics 
should be inspired by Islamic values. These values inspired by the Shari’a should 
have an important impact on political conduct” (Interview with the author, June 
2003). 
Ghannouchi is all of a sudden arguing for a political system based on values. He 
opens for the use of a democratic system in that he finds no detailed instructions for 
politics in Islam. However, he confirms that any political system used in Muslim 
societies needs to be based on values found in Shari’a. 
According to Ghannouchi, Islam includes several principles that are shared with 
democratic values (of the substantive model) . In addition to sovereignty of the 
people these are “political pluralism, protecting minority rights and tolerance, 
political power based on free elections, and respecting basic rights and freedoms” 
(Interview with Turkish Daily News 1996). 
Here Ghannouchi takes a step further arguing that many of the values found in Islam 
are in accordance with democratic values. In his argumentation the En-Nahda leader 
has parted from holding the position that democracy is a neutral tool. He has argued 
for the necessity of Islamic values in the political system. Finally he ends up with 
defending many of the Islamic values as equal to democratic values. This must be 
taken as a proof of Ghannouchi’s willingness to convince his readers that Islam and 
democracy are compatible. But while doing this he finds himself in the position of 
defending democracy as something more than a system for electing a leadership. He 
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is actually discussing democracy as a society model based on democratic values 
(democracy 2). Whether he is conscious of this or not is hard to say. 
 
Ghannouchi sees Shari’a (the Quran and the Sunna) and shura as the two main pillars 
in Islamic democracy. The Shari’a comes first as Allah is the original governor.  
“To uphold his [Allah’s] rule is obligatory for every Muslim, and this is why Muslims should 
organise themselves politically and form an Islamic state. The Islamic state’s raison d’être is the 
implementation of the Shari’a, which is also the source of its legitimacy; if it is not implemented, 
then it cannot command the obedience of the people.” (Hamdi 1998:104).  
When implementing the Shari’a, a Muslim’s obedience to the government is also 
obedience to Allah. Hamdi holds that Ghannouchi believes in a political system 
ordered by Allah. The details for this system are to be found in the Quran and Sunna, 
and full acceptance of these marks the difference between faith and disbelief (Hamdi 
1998:105).  
This is inconsistent with previously referred arguments made by Ghannouci that state 
the non-existence of a detailed political system in Islam. I believe this conflict is 
caused by the inconsistent use of on the one hand values and principles, and on the 
other hand the concept of political system.  
Ghannouchi further argues that “the Islamic state has found in the texts of the Shari’a 
a solid base and a code of just laws; a canon not made by the ruling majority or a 
dominant class, but by Allah, the God of all. This canon is applied in detail by human 
institutions chosen by the people, wherein lies the authority of the umma, embodied 
in shura” (Hamdi 1998:105).     
This argument makes it easier to understand Hamdi. What he means by ‘political 
system ordered by Allah’ is probably the authority of the ummah (Muslim 
community) given through shura. In other words, it is up to the Muslim community to 
decide on a political system. However, consultation (shura) should be part of this 
system. Ghannouchi writes: “Political power belongs to the community (ummah), 
which should adopt a form of shura, which is a system of mandatory consultation” 
(Ghannouchi 1993:55). Ghannouchi argues to have found in democracy “the 
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appropriate instruments (elections, parliamentary system, separation of powers etc) to 
implement the shura (Ghannouchi 1992). 
The principle of shura derives from the Quran where consultation is stressed 
repeatedly. The power of Allah is given to the people. Ghannouchi believes that man 
is God’s vicegerent on earth. The religious community, ummah, is thus responsible of 
forming a society according to God’s will (Tamimi 2001:96). Ghannouchi argues that 
the ummah is also the source of legislation: 
Although the prime source of legislation in Islam is Allah’s will, as is reflected in revelatory text 
from the Quran and the sunna, the umma should actively participate in legislating. The reason for 
this is that, making the final shari’a eternal required limiting the text of the revelation to legislate 
only the main principles ruling human relations and not to elaborate on details and minor issues, 
except for in a few cases such as legislating for the punishment of a major crime and for certain 
issues related to the family; legislation that helps form the overall shape of Islamic society. This 
means leaving the details of this shape to the legislative effort of the umma, which changes with 
the times, and it is a respectable endeavour, for the ijma [consensus]16 of the umma is considered 
one of the [religious] sources of legislation (Hamdi 1998:109-110).    
Shura means the consultation of the people rather than the sovereignty of the people. 
But Ghannouchi takes this further and says that shura “is the principle that the power 
of interpreting the text is not to be monopolized by any one particular person or 
institution; interpretation is the prerogative of the entire ummah, the vicegerent of 
God” (Tamimi 2001:100). 
En-Nahda argues that no one is sovereign in their understanding and interpretation of 
Islam (Interview with the author, June 2003). This is one of the many fields they base 
their critique of the Tunisian regime upon. En-Nahda believes the state is trying to be 
the sole and “official speaker in the name of Islam” (Interview with al-Shira 1994). 
En-Nahda parts from traditional Islam (represented by a majority of religious 
scholars) on this issue. It is a typical characteristic of Islamist groups to claim 
everyone’s right to personal interpretation. En-Nahda is also taking a slightly 
different stand than many other Islamists when arguing for the sovereignty of the 
people. This is exactly why others (for instance Ahmad in 3.3) reject democracy. 
                                              
16 My own addition to the text, ijma means consensus.  
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Many have a problem accepting democracy, because of the criterion of sovereignty of 
the people. Allah is the sole sovereign, they argue. Ghannouchi and En-Nahda are not 
opposing this point. Moreover, they emphasise the role given to the ummah as God’s 
vicegerent on earth. They believe this is enough evidence to claim that Islam is 
compatible with democracy and the principle of sovereignty of the people. The 
ummah and the ruler have, according to Ghannouchi, a contract which legitimates the 
ruler. No ruler is legitimate without being contracted or selected by the people 
(Ghannouchi 1992, Tamimi 2001:101). The ruler is then in his right to be obeyed by 
the nation (Hamdi1998:111), at the same time as he is accountable to the ummah 
(Tamimi 2001:101). If the ruler acts in conflict with the Shari’a it is not necessary for 
the people to obey him. Following this it is a duty within Islam to criticise and correct 
authorities that do wrong (Tamimi 2001:90). How exactly they will get rid of bad or 
autocratic rulers are not thoroughly discussed by Ghannouchi. There thoughts are 
similar to Weber and Schumpeter’s views on democracy (Democracy 1).    
 
Ghannouchi discusses three ways of shura. The first is a direct form, which 
encompass referendum and general elections concerning major political issues. These 
issues would be the direction of the state’s main policies, the choosing of a leader and 
entering military alliances (Hamdi 1998:110). “This direct shura, says Ghannouchi, is 
the textual implementation of the Quranic teaching which calls for the participation of 
all people in making the general policies of the state” (Hamdi 1998:110). 
The indirect form of shura would be the election of a body which would form a 
committee of shura, parliament. This parliament is to play the role of control and 
guidance for both the government and the people, and additionally make policies and 
laws within the framework of the Shari’a.  
A third consultative body will be formed by prominent religious and legal scholars, 
with main responsibility of making sure that all laws passed by the parliament or the 
government are compatible with the rules of Shari’a (Hamdi 1998:110). Ghannouchi 
himself has compared this to the High Court of the United States, but he fails to 
reveal on what basis the representatives of this body would be chosen.  
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The parliament (shura-council) is to nominate one or more candidates for the post of 
president. This should not hinder any other for running as candidate for the president 
post. The person elected president should not only be a Muslim, but a good Muslim, 
and he should be at least 40 years of age (Hamdi 1998:111). Ghannouchi remarks that 
“the minimum in this regard is for him to be known to have the correct religious 
beliefs and conceptions, to care for religion, to like knowledge and scholars, to 
observe his religious duties and abstain from forbidden deeds, to be honest and of 
good character with strong personality and physical capability, thus being able to 
serve the nation and lead it properly” (Hamdi 1998:111). The emphasis on the 
religious aspect is a consequence of the main duty of the president, to uphold the 
Shari’a. It would not be an easy decision to agree upon one person, with the correct 
religious belief. En-Nahda declared in 1981: “there is no one who can claim to be the 
official spokesman of Allah or Islam” (Hamdi 1998:114).  
There is further stated that “there is nothing in Islam which gives a specific ruling 
about the relationship between the legislative and the executive powers” (Hamdi 
1998:112). Ghannouchi hints about a system with co-operation between the two, and 
abolish the total separation of the powers as a Western institutionalisation of conflict 
between the president and the parliament. This gives us an Islamic state that is 
executive, based on both the parliament and the president’s authorities. This system 
is, however, not only found in En-Nahda’s model. Several Western democracies have 
established a similar approach, for instance Finland and France with their semi-
presidential systems (Peters 1999:81).  
The committee of religious and legal scholars should, according to Ghannouchi, 
check the compatibility between new laws and the Shari’a. At the same time this 
body is supposed to suggest or orientate both the public and the government when 
they find it necessary of using ijtihad in lawmaking. Following this, the committee of 
scholars becomes indirectly a legislative power. The separation of power becomes a 
diffuse issue when Ghannouchi suddenly sees the shura council as part of the 
executive power, presided over by the president (Hamdi 1998:113).  
Additionally, the nomination or selection of the scholars is not discussed, but it is 
evident that if the president or the parliament is to take care of this, we could see 
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tendencies like in the USA where every appointment of a new member of the High 
Court is political.                 
 
Public and Civil liberties. 
Ghannouchi argues that En-Nahda is fighting to win the struggle for civil liberties 
(Interview with Tunisia Insight, 1997). Freedom in Ghannouchi’s opinion goes 
through religion. In his view Islam was revealed to guarantee man’s essential needs 
(Tamimi 2001:76, Interview with Thomassen 1998:1). These guarantees given 
through Islam constitute, according to Ghannouchi, the general framework of human 
rights. 
The En-Nahda leader is negative to the liberal view on freedom. Liberties in the West 
are guaranteed through state institutions, but they are only formal, he argues. Man is 
given the theoretical right to do various things, but he is not given any real power to 
fulfil these rights. Ghannouchi criticizes the way a limited group of citizens have 
monopolised power, wealth, and culture (Tamimi 2001:73). This is follows the 
critique given by the New Left, Marxists, and the substantive democracy perspective 
on liberalism. Power and wealth is gathered in the hands of a small group of elites. 
Equality and total freedom is not really achieved for the rest of the citizens. 
Hence, Ghannouchi also argue against what he calls ‘negative freedom’. The liberal 
view saw the need to secure citizens from the state. Ghannouchi holds a more 
‘positive’ concept of freedom. He is compared to Kant who holds that freedom is the 
ability to realize oneself. Choices are connected to obedience toward moral law 
(Tamimi 2001:75). In comparison, Ghannouchi sees the moral law as obedience to 
Islam. In his version freedom is achieved through servitude to God. 
Ghannouchi believes the main message in Islam is to guarantee Human Rights 
(Thomassen 1998:1). Shari’a is meant to serve the interest of human beings, says the 
En-Nahda leader. Religion depends on true faith and free will, thus the starting-point 
of Islamic human rights is the freedom of belief (Hamdi 1998:107). 
In al-Hurriyat al-‘Ammah Ghannouchi lists seven basic rights: Equality (all citizens 
are equal before the law), freedom to practice religious worship, freedom to 
propagate non-Muslim religions, freedom and dignity of the human being, freedom of 
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thought and expression, freedom of private ownership and social rights (employment, 
health care and social security) (Hamdi 1998:108). These values are in accordance 
with democratic values. The question is whether they are respected within the Islamic 
democracy. 
Typically, there are some areas that are continually questioned when considering 
Islam and democracy. Religion and secularism are of this character, and I will treat 
this more thoroughly in 5.2 together with the rights of non-Muslims and Muslims that 
have rejected Islam (riddah).  
5.2 Religion in Politics  
Apart from the general scepticism surrounding the protection of human rights when 
dealing with Islamists, secularism or the impact of religion in politics is for many the 
main dilemma. As seen in 3.2, several scholars (Taylor, Walzer, Audi) hold 
secularism as a prerequisite for democracy. These scholars emphasis the freedom of 
religion and the non-discriminating elements that such a system will provide.  
In the discussion to come, I will first focus on En-Nahda/Ghannouchi’s general 
criticism towards secularism before considering Ghannouchi’s own thoughts on the 
issue. 
5.2.1 The general criticism of secularism 
When asking Mr. Ghannouchi if he believes democracy is possible without 
secularism, he answered:” Yes. Democracy can exist without secularism, and 
secularism can exist without democracy as for instance in Communism, Zionism and 
under Nazism.” (Interview with the author, June 2003). 
Ghannouchi’s stand is that secularism is not for the Muslim world. He believes there 
is a difference between secularism in the West and secularism in the Arab world. 
Ghannouchi do not reject secularism completely. He tends to agree in that secularism 
in the West has been necessary due to the nature of the Christian religion (Tamimi 
2001:109). During the Renaissance the Christian church possessed huge power over 
state and society. Ghannouchi comments: “There might have been genuine 
intellectual, psychological, and historical justifications for the rebellion against the 
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religious establishment, a rebellion, then, deemed essential for the emancipation of 
man and the progress of society” (Tamimi 2001:109). 
In contrast, the history of the Arab world did not see a comparable evolution, 
Ghannouchi holds. Secularism was imposed upon the Arab countries during 
colonialism. He criticises those who claim that Islam should be restricted to the 
spiritual or private sphere of life to achieve progress for Muslims (Tamimi 2001:112). 
In Ghannouchi’s view, secularism is entirely unnecessary in the Muslim world. Islam 
encourages research and innovation, and guarantees the freedom of thought, 
expression and worship (Tamimi 2001:112). Hence, Ghannouchi sees no reason to 
separate between religious values and livelihood to obtain progress and development 
(Tamimi 2001:112-113). He claims that the national governments that succeeded the 
colonial rulers in North Africa adopted the Western policy of secularisation. Small 
secular elites seized power and continued the westernization and secularisation of 
society (Tamimi 2001:122). But while secularisation in the West emancipated both 
religion and society from the powerful church, the consequences for North Africa 
were the opposite. Ghannouchi maintains that the state of the secular elite in the Arab 
experience is comparable with the previous hegemony of the church in the West. 
Secularisation has led to destruction of society and the emergence of a corrupt 
political system, he holds (Tamimi 2001:122).     
There seems to be agreement on the Western origin of secularism between Taylor and 
Ghannouchi. Taylor is convinced that this does not stop secularism from functioning 
in other parts of the world. Ghannouchi on the contrary sees the limitation of 
secularism, especially in the Muslim world. I will get back to this discussion later in 
this chapter.  
Ghannouchi declares that secularism was brought to North Africa through 
colonialism. This was a new experiment for the Arab world he states. Ruedy disagree 
with this apprehension. Even though secularism as a complete philosophy never was 
accepted in Islam, Ruedy claims that “the separation of the political and much of the 
civil from religious has been actual in most regions and during most periods in 
Islamic history” (Ruedy 1996:xv). According to Ruedy, “There were many ulama in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who accepted the distinction in various forms” 
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(Ruedy 1996:xv). It could seem that Ghannouchi is unwilling to see some of these 
facts. To me it looks like Ghannouchi is trying to blame every bad aspect of the 
regimes in North Africa on secularism. He opposes their monopolisation and control 
of religion, which is normally not understood as a question of secularism. But 
Ghannouchi has a point when describing secularism as when the state is taking 
control over religion. Turkey has conducted a policy of secularisation from the days 
of Ataturk. This policy has resulted in the controlling of religion instead of separating 
the religious institutions from the state.  
Another issue that is linked to secularism is the downplayed role of religion i public 
life. Bourguiba kept Sunday as the public rest-day through his whole Presidency, 
making the Muslim population work on their religious holyday, Friday. Moreover, 
traditional dressing (for instance veiling) was forbidden in Tunisia at public working 
places.   
5.2.2 Ghannouchi’s solution 
Ghannouchi: 
”Institutional separation of state and religion is not a problem in Islam. Islam is not represented by 
any institutional body as the church is in the Christian religion. So institutional secularisation is 
not a problem since there is no special authority representing Islam. There is no supremacy on 
how to interpret and decide in Islam. What we see in Iran is a very peculiar system. They have a 
religious body, a body that could not exist in Sunni-Islam. What I consider important is that 
politics should be inspired by Islamic values. These values inspired by the Shari’a should have an 
important impact on political conduct. In this sense I am against secularism, if this is meant to 
exclude religious values in politics.” (Interview with the author, June 2003).  
Ghannouchi maintains that there is no institutional body comparable with the 
Christian church in Islam. Hence, the institutional separation of state and religion is 
not hindering En-Nahda’s Islamic democracy (Interview with the author, June 2003).  
Still, there is no doubt that the goal is to establish an Islamic state. Religion will by 
no means be regarded as insignificant. 
In En-Nahda’s proposition for a shura-system, discussed under 5.1.2, they launched 
the idea of a consultative body consisting of prominent religious and legal scholars. 
These scholars are to check the compatibility of the Shari’a and new laws passed by 
the parliament. I would say that such a ‘consultative body’ runs the risk of becoming 
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not only powerful in religious matters, but also close to an institutional body like the 
Christian church used to be. If such a body is given the right to reject laws passed by 
the elected parliament, this could mean the end of institutional secularism, the 
principle of no special authority representing Islam, and moreover democracy. The 
democratic principle of political power based on free elections would run the risk of 
being put out of effect. There is no help in having a democratically elected parliament 
if this parliament is being restrained from power by other mechanisms. In Iran we see 
a system where the religious council (Majlis) has the power to overrule decisions 
made in parliament. Ghannouchi has however portrayed the Iranian system as 
impossible to convey into a Sunni Muslim society (Interview with the author, June 
2003). A problem is that Ghannouchi fails to give the details regarding how this 
consultative body of scholars will be appointed or elected. The composition of such a 
body will obviously affect the outcome of their politics. 
Ghannouchi has said that to En-Nahda it is important that Islam is defended as an 
identity for the Tunisian people (Interview with al-Shira 1994:3). This is the opposite 
of Taylor’s argumentation. Taylor agrees on the importance for the citizens in a state 
to have a common identification-basis. But he strongly advises to find something 
different than religion to identify with, especially in a religiously diverse society 
(Taylor 1998:45-46). The need to protect minorities must be a priority.  
Citizenship rights are among those rights that show discrimination. In The Right to 
Nationality Status of Non-Muslim Citizens in a Muslim Nation Ghannouchi argues 
that rights of the non-Muslims are ordained by divine law (Tamimi 2001:76-77). 
According to the En-Nahda leader, equality and freedom are protected for both 
Muslims and non-Muslims in an Islamic state.  
Ghannouchi’s general point is that other religious groups are free to live in an Islamic 
state with the same rights and duties as Muslims if they respect the authority of the 
state and the laws (Shari’a). They must recognise the right of Islam as the majority 
religion and the need to organise and direct public life according to Islam. Non-
Muslims are free to form their own political parties if they recognise the laws and 
pledge their loyalty to the state (Hamdi 1998:115). They are to some degree free to 
discuss religion with Muslims, though on a friendly basis (Hamdi 1998:108).   
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However, when it comes to citizenship Ghannouchi talks of two categories, 
unqualified (unconditioned) and qualified (conditioned) citizenship. This is caused by 
the freedom of choice for the people who live in an Islamic state. If one chooses to 
embrace Islam one also embraces the principles underpinning the state (Tamimi 
2001:77). However, if one rejects the Muslim religion one has to express loyalty to 
the state and to the state’s legitimacy, to achieve citizenship. Non-Muslim citizens 
have to refrain from activities “construed as threatening to the state’s order” (Tamimi 
2001:77). One will then receive a qualified or conditioned citizenship, and the 
condition is only lifted when one chooses to embrace Islam. 
Non-Muslims are deprived of certain rights like serving in key political roles such as 
head of state, speaker, chief of army and membership of the supreme council of 
justice (Hamdi 1998:116). On the other hand there are certain exceptions that a Non-
Muslim is free to enjoy which are forbidden for Muslims. This concerns issues in 
personal life like food, drink and marriage. 
The issue of non-Muslims and the following consequences for the human rights and 
democracy marks one of the central problems of Islamic democracy when compared 
to a Western understanding of democracy.      
Riddah (apostasy) is in classical literature defined as “the voluntary and conscious 
reversion to kufr (disbelief) after having embraced Islam by means of denying any of 
its fundamentals whether in matters of ‘aqidah (faith), Shari’a (law), or sha’irah 
(rite)” (Tamimi 2001:78). Ghannouchi discusses two different schools of 
jurisprudence when dealing with riddah. Most of the classical jurists belong to a 
school that treat riddah as a religious offence punishable by death. Ghannouchi 
however subscribes to a school that considers riddah a political offence. To him it is 
not subject to Hudud (Islamic capital punishments) (Interview with al-Shira 1994). In 
this case riddah has nothing to do with the Islamic guarantee of a person’s right to 
freedom of faith. Riddah becomes sedition instead of apostasy and is a problem 
connected to the authority’s responsibility for the community and the maintenance of 
law and order (Tamimi 2001:78). Ghannouchi’s interpretation of this issue has for 
instance made him unwanted as a guest in the Arab Peninsula (Tamimi 2001:78).       
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With this interpretation Ghannouchi avoids ‘breaking’ his own human rights. Still, he 
supports the notion that apostasy is wrong. He says, “the judgement on apostasy is in 
the hereafter” (Interview with al-Shira 1994). It clearly troubles Ghannouchi and 
other thinkers within Islam that the Quran deals with this problem and even sets the 
punishment for apostasy. His stand in this case really shows that he is an Islamist in 
favour of change. Literalist believers would never dream of concluding like 
Ghannouchi. As in regard to democracy and human rights it is easy to see that 
Ghannouchi is trying to interpret more in line with the principle of freedom of belief. 
The fact that apostasy is mentioned concretely in the Quran is impossible for him to 
overlook. This is one of the cases where his faith is really troubling him and he is not 
quite able to adjust to a more modern system. Needless to say, apostasy (riddah) gives 
Ghannouchi a problem of explanation when trying to promote his ideas as democratic 
and in line with human rights. 
Returning to the discussion on the principles of freedom and equality it is obvious 
that an Islamic state adhering to democracy will have problems guaranteeing these 
rights. As a consequence of Ghannouchi’s understanding of an Islamic democracy, 
non-Muslims will be restricted from certain opportunities such as holding major 
positions in the political system.  
Apart from this Ghannouchi is making a point of freedom in religious belief. Walzer, 
who argues for a separation of religion and politics on the basis of freedom in 
religion, has addressed this scenario (see chap 3.2). He admits it is possible to achieve 
a just system if different religious groups receive autonomy within the religious state. 
Ghannouchi portrays such a system. Audi and Taylor on the other hand point out the 
lack of equality they believe a non-secular state will provide. They fear the majority’s 
overruling of the minority. Wolterstorff is arguing for the lack of equality a secular 
system might give. He sees this as taking side with non-religious groups. 
Important in this discussion is the role of religious values in politics. En-Nahda is 
doubtless in favour of this mixing. In my interview with Rachid Ghannouchi he 
formulated himself vaguely: “values inspired by Shari’a” (Interview with the author, 
June 2003). Islamists normally have a goal of implementing the Shari’a. When asking 
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the En-Nahda leader how they would solve, if given power, the fact that many dislike 
their ideas, he answered: 
“The future is through ijtihad. I think most things can be solved there. We might not get to 
interpret everything, but we can use ijtihad in some areas and not in others. If we get in political 
power and the majority want to implement more laws inspired by Shari’a, then we will probably 
do that. We are going to listen to the sovereignty of the people. But now the mainstream of 
Tunisia is neither Islamists nor positive to ijtihad.” (Interview with the author, June 2003). 
In other words, they aim at implementing more laws ‘inspired’ by Shari’a. I believe 
he uses the word inspired for two reasons. It does not sound as they are trying to 
implement Shari’a, inspired is more acceptable in peoples’ mind. Secondly, 
Ghannouchi is interested in using ijtihad. This means that he wants to make new laws 
adjusted to contemporary society. The use of ijtihad in Islam is controversial. Most 
traditional Muslims and ulama argue that this door of interpretation is closed. Many 
Islamists that have focused on progress and developments disagree. They argue the 
need of new laws in accordance with modern society. In that the Shari’a probably 
does not mention many of these areas that, according to Ghannouchi, need laws, they 
have to come up with solutions in accordance with the spirit of Shari’a or Islam.  
Audi, Taylor and Wolterstorff all address the issue of religious values or principles in 
politics. Audi argues that a neutral ethic as the basis for politics is the only fair 
alternative. Taylor says it is impossible to control the underlying reasons for why 
people decide on something. That is why he argues for the overlapping consensus-
approach as the only possible alternative. According to Taylor, people may have 
whatever reason they want to agree on a decision, the important element is that they 
agree on something. Wolterstorff agrees in the hopelessness of trying to control 
people’s reasons for supporting or rejecting political issues. He holds it as necessary 
for the well-being of a vital and vivid pluralistic democratic system. 
 
Ghannouchi is aware of the Islamists’ limited popularity. Consequently, he is not 
trying to put himself into a corner by giving a recipe for governance. In his article 
The Participation of Islamists in a non-Islamic Government Ghannouchi stresses a 
cooperative approach to political power. First, he states that the Shari’a was set up to 
serve the interests of man (Ghannouchi 1993:54). Second, he holds that “justice is the 
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most important feature of an Islamic government” (Ghannouchi 1993:59). 
Ghannouchi then argues that under special circumstances such as when the 
implementation of an Islamic government is impossible, the duty of Muslims is to 
support a just government. Ghannouchi suggests that Islamists should engage in 
alliances with secular democratic groups to achieve a just secular democratic system. 
In other words, Ghannouchi sees a secular democratic system as second best after the 
Islamic democratic system. 
He holds that power-sharing becomes a necessity, and it should be based on the 
authority of the ummah ( according to the principle of shura).  
“..the community of believers may participate in an alliance aimed at preventing injustice and 
oppression, at serving the interests of mankind, at protecting human rights, at recognising the 
authority of the people and at rotating power holding through a system of elections. The faithful 
can pursue all these noble objectives even with those who do not share the same faith or 
ideology“(Ghannouchi 1993:58). 
Ghannouchi gives some examples of situations that justify this practice. Muslims that 
hold a minority in their country should enter such an alliance, he argues. A secular 
democratic government will respect human rights, ensuring security and freedom of 
expression and belief (Ghannouchi 1993:60). Secondly, Ghannouchi finds that 
Islamic movements operating in Muslim majority countries with autocratic rulers 
should cooperate with secular parties.  
The most remarkable example Ghannouchi gives is that of Islamic groups with 
potential majority living in Muslim majority countries with autocratic rulers. It would 
be expected that these groups should seize power and implement Shari’a laws etc. 
Still Ghannouchi hesitates. He suggests that these groups should establish a secular 
democratic system to avoid hostility from both within and outside their country 
(Ghannouchi 1993:61). He advises these groups to postpone “the long-term objective 
of establishing an Islamic government until circumstances permits” (Ghannouchi 
1993:61). 
Ghannouchi’s advice to cooperate with secular forces and establish a democratic 
secular system is interesting. He justifies this behaviour out of a need to secure some 
important Islamic values or principles (when all seems impossible to reach). This 
thought is actually very much in accordance with Charles Taylor’s secular model of 
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overlapping consensus. Taylor argues that the important thing is to agree on some 
political principles. The underlying motivation or argumentation for supporting these 
principles is insignificant (Taylor 1998:38). In fact, Taylor believes there are small 
chances of finding an overall agreement for the underlying justifications for any such 
principle. In comparison, Ghannouchi holds that the best interest of man and a just 
government are important Islamic principles. This leads to his support for the secular 
democratic system, under the circumstances mentioned above. In this situation the 
principle of a secular democracy is, in his opinion, made upon Islamic values.   
The question of religious diversity is important in this discussion. As seen, 
Ghannouchi is in favour of establishing an Islamic democracy if winning political 
power in Tunisia. Tunisia is religiously a homogenous society with a 98% Muslim 
population and with small Catholic, Jewish and Protestant communities (Worldstates, 
December 15, 2003 [online]). Would the chances of violations on the principles of 
freedom and equality be major if implementing an Islamic democracy? The theories 
referred to in 3.2 are mostly concerned with religious diverse societies. My 
assumption would be that the violations against the Catholic and Jewish communities 
would be minimal in such a scenario. However, I would be concerned about the 
secular Muslim population. As a consequence of many years with a secular policy in 
Tunisia, it is likely to assume that parts of the Tunisian population have become 
secular as well. In a scenario where the Islamists win the election and constitute a 
majority, will they respect the secular Muslim minority?             
5.3 A different kind of Democracy? 
As seen in 5.1 En-Nahda expresses its support to democracy. Critics have sometimes 
trouble believing in this dedication to democracy and reject this as tactical 
considerations. I have however chosen to take En-Nahda’s claims seriously when 
investigating their expressed thoughts in this matter. Hence, they express without 
doubt support to a democratic system of some sort. The trouble is finding out what 
kind of democratic system this represents.  
Mr. Ghannouchi talks and writes most of the time about the political tools of 
democracy. His standpoint is that democracy provides good tools for politics that 
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should be taken advantage of. Accordingly, when they are being asked directly about 
this issue, Ghannouchi and En-Nahda are in favour of seeing democracy as formal 
(Democracy 1 in my dichotomy). However, as seen in the discussion made in 5.1, I 
do not find this stand compatible with Mr. Ghannouchi’s argumentation. I am not 
questioning Ghannouchi’s faith in the tools of democracy. Moreover, I believe he is 
arguing for democracy as something more. He is repeatedly stressing popular 
sovereignty, equality, human rights etc, which he finds both in Islam and democracy. 
To me it seems like Mr. Ghannouchi is using values to justify an Islamic democracy. 
He is trying to convince his audience that these values are in accordance with Islam 
and Islamist principles. By focusing on Islamic principles he is trying to stay clear of 
what is triggering the general disapproval of democracy in Muslim countries, namely 
the increase of Western thoughts and domination. The fear of Western dominance is 
making many Muslims reject solutions of Western origin, especially Islamists. This is 
probably why Ghannouchi is trying to convince his audience that democracy, in his 
image, is a neutral tool that can be transformed into an Islamic system. 
Secularism is one of the Western principles that Ghannouchi openly disapproves of. 
He finds total secularisation of politics in conflict with Islam. However, 
secularisation is not a prerequisite for democracy in Ghannouchi’s opinion. This is 
one of the Western values he tends to see as a historical specificity of Western and 
Christian society. To him this does not concern Muslim societies. However, it seems 
like he believes secularism is part of a broader society model of democratic values 
(Democracy 2 in my dichotomy). But as seen in the discussion on religion in 3.2 
there are different opinions on this issue. Secularisation is not argued for out of its 
own sake. The reason for why people argue in this direction is the principles of 
freedom and equality. Scholars such as Taylor, Audi and Walzer believe that the 
mixing of religion in politics is bound to violate the principle of equality, and 
probably also people’s freedom. They are concerned of the minorities’ rights. Walzer 
is however willing to view a society that gives the different religious minorities 
autonomy as morally just (Walzer 1995:288-289).  
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In contrast, Wolterstorff stresses the violation of freedom that a secular state will 
provide for the religious. Additionally, he believes that the religious communities will 
be discriminated compared to the non-religious.  
As for Tunisia where 98%  of the population are Muslims the violations would 
probably not be vast. The country has a small Christian Catholic community as well 
as a tiny Jewish community in the south. En-Nahda has portrayed autonomy for these 
communities when it comes to religious and family matters. Still the conditioned 
citizenship seems discriminating along with the prohibition to serve in central 
government/state positions. Likewise the treatment of apostasy (riddah), even though 
Ghannouchi views this as a political offence, is obviously in conflict with the 
principle of freedom. 
On the other hand, Ghannouchi admits that next to Islamic democracy he views a 
secular democracy as the best option. This statement is confusing. Again the question 
of homogeneousness in religion matters. It is only in countries where Islamists are in 
majority that he believes in establishing an Islamic democracy. And even in this 
situation he hesitates and stresses the importance in waiting for the right moment.   
So, where does this leave the Islamic democracy of Mr. Ghannouchi and En-Nahda? 
Comparing this question with the discussions made in 3.3 might help placing the En-
Nahda alternative. 
It is obvious that Ghannouchi/En-Nahda and Huntington see things differently. 
Huntington portrays the Muslim culture as in lack of certain qualities – qualities that 
in Huntington’s opinion are important for democratic life. Among these qualities are 
individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, rule of 
law, separation of church and state etc (Huntington 1993:40). Mr. Ghannouchi has 
actually mentioned most of these qualities when discussing Islamic democracy. He 
stressed for instance the principles of sovereignty of the people, political pluralism, 
protection of minority rights and tolerance, political power based on free elections, 
respect for basic rights and freedoms to Turkish Daily News (1996). As mentioned in 
5.1.2, Ghannouchi has written about the importance of human rights in al-Hurriyat al-
‘Ammah. Here he lists seven basic rights including equality of law and freedom of 
expression. There can be no doubt that Ghannouchi considers these qualities as 
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crucial to an Islamic democracy. Secularism makes the springing point where he sees 
no reason to agree with Huntington’s list.  
When comparing Ghannouchi/En-Nahda’s views with Kurshid Ahmad, there are 
many similarities. Since both are proclaimed Islamists this seems logic. They are both 
sceptic to Western influence and they both support and believe in a system where the 
people run worldly affairs in accordance with the Shari’a. Ahmad makes a distinction 
between democracy’s philosophical roots and democracy’s operational mechanisms. 
Apparently Ghannouchi makes a similar separation, but his argumentation is different 
from Ahmad’s. Ahmad rejects what he calls democratic philosophical roots on the 
basis of the concept of popular sovereignty. Ahmad’s reason for denying the principle 
of popular sovereignty is that it contradicts, in his view, with the principle of God as 
the ‘Supreme Law-Giver’. In contrast, En-Nahda formulates support, as seen in 5.1.1, 
to the principle of popular sovereignty in their first political goal found in Article 2 of 
the En-Nahda Constitution from 1988. 
Ghannouchi argues for the rejection of Western philosophical roots mostly out of 
disagreement with the principles of secularism, nationalism17, and the building of an 
elite of political leaders. When looking deeper into this argumentation, I have not 
found a precise and unified understanding of democracy that makes these principles 
mandatory. Secularisation as a prerequisite for a substantive democracy based on 
democratic values is contested, though most Western scholars are in favour of 
secularisation as such a prerequisite.  
In the matter of democratic rights within national borders, I have not found a 
discussion around this issue. The restriction of democratic rights to each state is a 
result of the world’s system of states. Still, one could say that institutions calling for 
international declarations of for instance Human Rights are touching upon this 
problem of inequality. In recent years there has been a tendency of increased interest 
in international cooperation. The UN and other instances has functioned as an 
initiator for making as many countries as possible sign different declarations. One has 
                                              
17 As in the restriction of liberal democracy within national boundaries, see 5.1.2, The relationship to Western democracy 
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to assume that the purpose of these declarations is to increase the equality and rights 
both between countries and between people from different parts of the world.    
As for the problem of the development of elites of political leaders, several 
philosophers have addressed such a scenario. Schumpeter is among those who favour 
this type of system while those representing New Left are highly critical of this trend. 
Once again, the point here is: contributors to liberal democracy as well as the practice 
of liberal democracies are not unified. 
 
Esposito and Voll’s main argument is that Islamic democracy must be based on 
Islamic culture, history, and familiar Islamic institutions. The development of 
democracy in the West combined older anti-democratic institutions with newer 
democratic ones. Esposito and Voll believe this is the way to go for Islamic societies 
as well. Consequently, there is a need for respecting Islamic concepts in 
democratisation processes in Muslim countries. In doing this, the process of 
democratisation can take form through a reconceptualisation of these institutions.  
One could argue that En-Nahda is about to make such a reconceptualisation of 
democracy in a Tunisian context. They argue for the importance of Islamic and Arab 
history and culture. Additionally, they have for instance brought up the old concept of 
Shura as one of their main democratic institutions. The principle of Tawheed (there 
can be only one sovereign and that is God) which Esposito and Voll discuss 
(1996:23) has already been transformed by En-Nahda to allow for popular 
sovereignty in that man is God’s vicegerent on earth. By applying a broader 
interpretation that sees different principles in relation to each other one opens for 
non-traditional conclusions. 
 
Hefner’s argument is that civil society or civility is the main prerequisite for the 
possibility of developing a successful democracy. He holds that this is historically 
conditioned within each society in contrast to Huntington’s hypothesis which limits 
democratisation to Western civilisation. In Hefner’s view, civility can occur in every 
civilisation and following also in Muslim societies. The question is whether the 
Tunisian society has experienced this type of civil society. 
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One of Ghannouchi’s main accusations against the Tunisian regime is that they have 
not supported a civil society. On the contrary, he claims that the Tunisian 
governments since independence have repressed or worked against such 
developments. Ghannouchi is positive to the theories of civil society as a contributory 
cause to the development of democracy. Unlike many other Islamists he sees no 
reason for not bringing this concept into use (Tamimi 2001:132-133). He opposes the 
understanding that civil society is liked to secularisation and he holds the Islamic 
society as being part of civil society (Tamimi 2001:136-127). Ghannouchi has a 
theory about the development of the Tunisian civil society. He argues that the Muslim 
society prior to the colonisation was vivid, dynamic and self-reviving. The 
independence of civic institutions secured economic, cultural and social activities, he 
argues (Tamimi 2001:127). During the colonisation these activities were repressed 
and the following independent government continued this policy (Tamimi 2001:127). 
I believe Ghannouchi is right in many of his accusations against the post-
independence Tunisian regimes. Much of the activity in the Tunisian post-
independent society were cooperated into the control of the state (for instance trade- 
and workers unions and religious institutions). I find En-Nahda as being part of a 
civil society in Tunisia, though repressed. And I believe much of their fight for 
democratisation in Tunisia is a direct cause of their denied chances to participate and 
spread their views. Their stand on this issue has been made clear in their Constitution 
(see goal 1 on political level and goal 13 on the social level).       
 
When concluding where En-Nahda stands in the democratic debate I try to compare 
their declared position with their argumentation. I believe En-Nahda to be an Islamic 
movement in favour of an evolutionist approach to religion and with a wish to work 
within the political system (as in opposite of revolution). Accordingly, En-Nahda 
belongs to those Islamists most likely to be positive to democracy. 
As for which democratic system they support it is a strong argument that the 
movement regards itself as positive to formal democracy. This claim seems sincere 
and I find no reason why En-Nahda should not be called democratic in this 
perspective. As long as the procedures and mechanisms taking into use are 
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democratically agreed upon, which is En-Nahda’s articulated stand, this system 
should work well.  
Regarding the question of whether En-Nahda’s Islamic democracy is fulfilling the 
criteria  for Democracy 2, it gets more complicated. While Democracy 1 was all 
about procedures, Democracy 2 includes content. Democratic values need to 
comprise all society and decisions must not violate against the democratic values.         
Ghannouchi has supported democracy as a neutral tool separated from Western 
philosophers theories. Still, I can not see the difference between En-Nahda’s Islamic 
democracy and other society models based on certain values. In my opinion, the 
Islamic democracy is exactly such an attempt to create a ‘good society’. Ghannouchi 
is not only occupied with election procedures and the building of democratic 
institutions. I believe to have shown his concern with freedom, equality and human 
rights. I am not sure that Mr. Ghannouchi is aware of this, but I believe his negative 
attitude towards democracy as something more than a tool is based on the assumption 
that such a system must draw on Western philosophical theories. This was probably 
the general stand among scholars earlier in the 20th century. But I believe to have 
shown that several scholars view this differently today. Hefner and Esposito & Voll 
are among those who believe in democratic solutions based on local habits and 
culture.  
Hence, my conclusion is that I believe Ghannouchi is arguing for a system according 
to Democracy 2. I view this argumentation as a sincere wish for real influence of the 
Tunisian people and a more accountable political system in Tunisia. Still, I can not 
see that En-Nahda has succeeded in protecting all parts of the people in such a 
system. This is mostly due to their religious concerns. By this I do not suggest that 
the chances to make a Democracy 2 system is ruled out by the including of religion in 
the political system. The clue is rather to find a way to balance this mixture with the 
protection of democratic values.  
The proposition of conditioned and unconditioned citizenship is in obvious contrast 
to the principle of equality. Likewise, the punishment for apostasy provides no 
freedom in religion. This makes me draw the conclusion that En-Nahda has in spite 
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of everything a way to go before supporting a system that sorts under the Democracy 
2 categorisation.            
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6. Conclusion  
One dilemma concerning Islam and democracy is the reluctance towards human-
made laws. Religious forces are often eager to promote the Islamic law (Shari’a) as a 
sufficient political and legal system. This stand is obviously hindering the formation 
of democratic politics due to a negative attitude towards more modern solutions. In 
their opinion the Quran and the Sunna is God’s final revelation to the people, and 
accordingly this wisdom is complete. One has to agree that the way we view 
democracy today is a result of modern developments and knowledge. Accordingly, if 
arguing that an Islamic system based on Shari’a is democratic, one would assume that 
this system is open for modern adjustments. Among Islamists one can find 
spokespersons for modern adjustments. Extensive use of interpretation is the solution 
they offer. These groups are often more willing to change the political system than 
those in power. However, many Islamists are not planning to change the system 
towards a democratic one. And those who are promoting democratisation face the 
problem that few believe their efforts to be sincere.   
 
This thesis started out raising the question whether Islamists’ mixing of religious laws 
with politics would allow for a democratic system. The scope was then narrowed 
down to a specific case when asking: 
To what extent is the Islamic democracy of the Tunisian En-Nahda democratic?  
En-Nahda was chosen as case due to the explicit communication of an Islamic 
democracy. Consequently the case serves as an unique opportunity to explore an 
Islamist movement’s view on democracy.  
 
When writing the dissertation I found it necessary to give a broader understanding of 
Islamism in chapter 2. It seemed impossible to analyse an Islamist movement without 
this background information. Additionally, it was important for me to show that I am 
conscious of the wide spectre of directions within this phenomenon. Hence, I have 
not tried to draw a general conclusion about the relation between Islamism and the 
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question of democracy. My aim has exclusively been to show how the Tunisian 
Islamist movement, En-Nahda, argues over the question of democracy. 
 
I started this thesis by claiming that I would avoid seeing democracy as a strictly 
Western concept. Despite of this initial position, democratic theory draws heavily on 
Western philosophers. My original stand in chapter 3 was to conduct a wide 
discussion to avoid giving a limited impression of the theory. A major criticism from 
scholars on the subject of democracy’s possibility outside the West, is that democracy 
too often is portrayed as one consistent model. Despite this, I became aware of the 
necessity to limit my scope to be able to conduct an analysis. As shown, I ended up 
with a constructed dichotomy of democracy. The concepts of formal and substantive 
democracy, comprised in my dichotomy, can be viewed without too much reference 
to Western philosophy. Even though I found Western philosophers that roughly 
supported these concepts, I believe the concepts can be used in a general context.  
Further, I decided to discuss the question of religion in relation to democracy. This 
was a natural consequence of the definition made in 2.2.1, that Islamist groups aim at 
establishing an Islamic state ruled by the Shari’a. If the political model of an Islamist 
organisation has to be based on or influenced by Islamic law, what are the 
consequences for democracy? In 3.2 the subject of religion and the consequences for 
democracy was discussed in general. I found that secularism is not necessarily 
required to achieve democracy. 
Additionally, I included some contributions on the discussion on democracy and its 
compatibility with Islamism. I found it natural to have this discussion fresh in mind 
when analysing En-Nahda’s Islamic democracy. The discussion also serves as a basis 
for comparison with the En-Nahda stand. 
Finally, I concluded chapter 3 with a clarification of the different sections and their 
internal link to stress the framework for an analysis. My general conclusion was to 
apply a dichotomy when analysing. Further I concluded that the mixing of religion 
and politics had little effect on a formal democracy. Regarding the substantive 
alternative I found that the impact of religion in politics would have to allow all 
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people to have real influence while simultaneously respecting certain values to fulfil 
the criteria of this models.   
 
Chapter 4 was carried out for the purpose of giving a general understanding and some 
background information of the situation in which En-Nahda operates. Referring to the 
methodological considerations, qualitative case studies require a deeper 
understanding of the object in research, and the influence of its surroundings.      
             
In chapter 5 I decided to analyse simultaneously as presenting the model for Islamic 
democracy. 
I used theoretical perspectives to explore and organise En-Nahda’s concept of Islamic 
democracy. I believe my democracy dichotomy helped in understanding and 
categorising the argumentation presented by Ghannouchi and En-Nahda. Important 
findings were consequently revealed when the En-Nahda argumentation alternated 
between supporting Democracy 1 and Democracy 2. As pointed out En-Nahda openly 
supports Democracy 1, consequently the findings in support of Democracy 2 was 
rather unexpected. Still, the two concepts are not mutually excluding. One may 
support the tools of a formal democracy while simultaneously argue for a more 
substantive democracy.  
Likewise, I took use of the discussion over religion and secularism made in 3.2. The 
purpose was to show how religion influences democracy. In that En-Nahda rejects 
secularism, the need to explore their solution in this perspective was present. By 
keeping an open-minded attitude, where secularism was argued for over the 
consequences for democratic values and not for its own sake, this discussion was 
conducted in 5.2.  
My results achieved through the analysis were commented in 5.3. I tried to compare 
En-Nahda’s Islamic democracy with the dichotomy as well as with the views on 
Islamism and democracy presented earlier in 3.3. To define a system like En-Nahda’s 
was not an easy task. I realised that the Islamic democracy was approaching a more 
extensive form of democracy described as the substantive form. The mixing of 
religion and politics was argued for while trying to protect all groups in society. En-
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Nahda holds that decisions made need to be based on popular will. This was 
confirmed in 5.2 where Ghannouchi opens up for cooperation with secular forces. He 
makes it clear that En-Nahda would support a secular democratic system if not 
receiving the electoral majority. The important goal being to be able to influence 
towards a just system. In my interview with Ghannouchi he further holds that even 
though En-Nahda wishes to use ijtihad to implement laws inspired by Shari’a, this 
would not be possible without majority support.  
These are strong arguments in favour of a broader understanding of democracy that 
take into consideration more than electoral mechanisms. The respect for democratic 
values and real influence is acknowledged. Unfortunately limitations were 
simultaneously found in their model, making it hard to conclude in accordance with 
Democracy 2. The rights of religious minorities and especially rights for those not 
religious at all, seem troublesome to the Islamic democracy when compared to 
Democracy 2. Consequently, I find the Islamic democracy of En-Nahda approaching 
a substantive democracy, based on democratic values, that gives people real 
influence. Unfortunately the system suffers from some restrictions making it hard to 
completely embrace the Democracy 2 categorisation. As for the formal democratic 
categorisation, I have found no major arguments hindering En-Nahda from sorting 
under this label.  
 
As the critics have pointed out, there are concerns whether En-Nahda would act as 
they profess in a situation where they obtain power. I believe En-Nahda to be more 
sincere in their support for democracy than maybe other Islamists due to En-Nahda’s 
effort in portraying their model. It seems unrealistic to take time to develop such an 
extensive system, to communicate it and to defend it, if the movement has no plans of 
applying it. Still, I have no guarantees that the system would be followed in detail.  
In my opinion it is naive to promote a policy where a major force is being excluded 
from the political scene. The critics of Islamism are afraid the Islamists will violate 
democratic values. But by excluding the Islamists from politics, the critics themselves 
are the ones violating against democracy. It would be better to try including the 
Islamists in the democratisation of the state. If the popular support for the Islamists 
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are as solid as indicated in some elections, one needs to include these voters in a 
democratic project. Whether the Islamist support would remain strong after 
democratic elections with debates and open critics remains to see. 
 
As stressed in the introduction my aim has not been to draw general lessons on the 
subject of Islamists and democracy. My single case study of Tunisian En-Nahda 
would not serve as sufficient evidence to make any such conclusions. However, I 
believe the lesson learnt from this dissertation is that one can not rule out the 
possibility that Islamist groups may argue in favour of democracy.  
Their conception of democracy tend to be slightly different than the Western-
established understanding, but may equally be regarded as democratic. And the 
Western understanding of democracy has shown to be less established than most like 
to believe.  
In my opinion much of the negative views on democracy that Islamists articulate are 
caused by the Western origin of the concept. The negativity towards the West, mostly 
due to historical events such as crusades, colonisation and general exploitation, is 
deeply rooted in Islamist thinking. This makes it hard for Islamists to fully embrace 
democracy even though Ghannouchi and probably many with him would support 
most of the principles that democracy is based upon.  
     
Currently En-Nahda is heavily repressed and unable to promote itself in Tunisia. The 
movement is active outside Tunisia, operating from a London office. Ghannouchi 
attends discussions and conferences, trying to convince the audience of the Tunisian 
regime’s unfair treatment of En-Nahda. Ghannouchi sees it as the number one goal to 
achieve democracy in Tunisia. He argues for the necessity of getting every political 
party to respect and listen to each other. To work for the En-Nahda policy in Tunisia 
is useless if they can not attend the political arena. Consequently, Ennahda’s goal for 
the next ten years is not to seize power, but to make people understand the 
organisations views. The leader is positive in this regard as he gets reports of 
increased activities in the Tunisian mosques as well as an increase in interest 
concerning Islamic questions.   
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Ghannouchi is convinced that Tunisia will democratise with or without President Ben 
Ali. Simultaneously he admits that the prospects are currently not looking good.                    
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